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Edwin T. “Win” McKeithen 1 
5 November, 2007 - Chiang Rai, Thailand 2 
Interviewer/Editor – Paul Hillmer 3 
Transcriber – Diane Schuessler 4 
 5 
Edwin “Win” McKeithen was born in Old Greenwich Connecticut.  After attending Williams College for two years 6 
he quit school and joined International Voluntary Services in the Fall of 1962.  Instead of being sent to Vietnam, as 7 
he expected, he went to Laos just as the Geneva Accords were going into effect.  After working in the north for two 8 
years, he was reassigned to the Bolovens Plateau where he worked for another year before returning to the US to finish 9 
college.  He returned to Laos to work for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in the fall of 10 
1966, stationed at Sam Thong.  He remained there until 1971, when Sam Thong was overrun and his father died, 11 
sending him back to Connecticut. In his absence the Sam Thong operation moved to Ban Xon, where McKeithen 12 
returned later that year.  There he remained until the Vientiane Accords were signed in 1973.  Next he worked in 13 
Vientiane in USAID’s program offices where his responsibilities included the refugee and public health programs, 14 
where he worked closely with Dr. Charles Weldon. He witnessed the evacuation of American personnel from 15 
Vientiane in May 1975 and remained behind for a few weeks to ascertain the Communist Party’s negotiating strategy 16 
before he was sent back to Washington, DC.  After writing his reports he followed Dr. Weldon to Haiti in 1975 17 
before receiving an assignment to Bangkok in 1979 to help with the postwar refugee crisis and later USAID 18 
Thailand public health programs.  He returned to Washington for four years before returning to Bangkok for another 19 
five years working once again in public health.  He returned to Laos in 1991, 1997, and finally in 2002.  Mr. 20 
McKeithen spoke extensively about his remembrances of his service in Laos and Thailand and the individuals with 21 
which he worked, including General Vang Pao, Pop Buell and Dr. Charles Weldon.  22 
 This interview was conducted in an outdoor courtyard at a hotel in Chiang Rai, Thailand. 23 
 24 
 25 
(2:40)  …Well, if you don't mind, let's just start with sort of your personal background, 26 
where you were born and raised and went to school and anything that you think might help 27 
explain how you ended up taking the career path that you chose. 28 
I was—I grew up in Connecticut, Old Greenwich, Connecticut, went to high school there.  Went to 29 
Williams College and I quit after two-and-a-half years.  I was sort of lost.  It was actually the best 30 
grades I'd ever gotten, but I quit midway through junior year and went to Laos with IVS, and—31 
International Voluntary Services. 32 
 33 
(3:20)  What year was that? 34 
'62.  Fall of 1962. 35 
So you were in pretty early in the game. 36 
Yes.  Although IVS had started there in the late 50s, '58, and—I think '58.  So I thought I was going 37 
to go to Vietnam, but I they sent me to Laos instead.  And I got there just as the Geneva Accords of 38 
July of 1962 were coming into force, which called for the withdrawal of White Star and everybody 39 
else.  And so I watched the last Special Forces troops leave the airport, leave Vientiane. 40 
 41 
(4:09)  Now technically was White Star just a designation for the Special Forces who had 42 
been assigned to Laos? 43 
Yes.  Yes. 44 
OK. 45 
It was an acronym.  So I served a little over two years there.  Then I went back and finished up at 46 
Williams and then joined the Foreign Service and, to my surprise, got reassigned back to Laos, 47 
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which was fine and went to work for Pop Buell.  Went to work for the refugee program and spent—48 
lived in Sam Thong for five years.  And when I was working for IVS from '62 to '64, I had thought 49 
that—I had thought that I was going to, in my second year, be assigned to Sam Thong because IVS 50 
also had a couple guys in Sam Thong.  And thinking that I was going to be assigned there, I studied 51 
Hmong for several months.  I learned the phonetic system.  I learned the reading and writing.  I 52 
never got very far in terms of substance.  But it's really fascinating because it's a very interesting 53 
alphabet.  I mean, a very interesting language.  Eight tones and so forth.  Anyway, I never—instead, 54 
I got assigned to southern Laos to the Bolovens Plateau—other—also some interesting languages.  55 
And then—so I finished college—from—I went back to college in spring of '65, graduated in '66, 56 
and came back to Vientiane to Laos in fall, I guess of '66.  Went up to Sam Thong and lived there 57 
for five years until '71, until it fell.  My father died in '71, I went back to the U.S. and coincidentally, 58 
Sam Thong fell in the spring of '71.  He died in February.  Sam Thong fell sometime thereafter and I 59 
sort of watched it or heard about it on TV, sitting back in Connecticut.  And then came back out. 60 
 61 
(6:48)  So the fall of Sam Thong was announced on television? 62 
Well, it was covered—it was covered on TV.  I mean, those—naturally, I was interested in following 63 
the news and I made a point to try to find out as much as I could.  It was—so, I went back in '71 64 
and the refugee operation in Sam Thong had moved to Ban Xon, south of Xieng Khouang 65 
Province.  And we operated out of there until '73.  And that was when the neutrality accords, I think 66 
they were called, the Vientiane Accords were signed.  And I then got a different job working in the 67 
program office in Vientiane, but doing program—the program offices, the budgeting and planning 68 
office that puts together programs for AID, puts together the Congressional presentation, monitors, 69 
the—we helped the officers deal with all of the paperwork, the massive paperwork that AID 70 
requires.  And I did—my portfolios included the refugee program, the public health program, where 71 
I got to know Dr. Weldon and Pat [McCreedy] Weldon very well and several other programs.  So 72 
'75, when Laos fell, the then-director, the acting director, Gordon Ramsey, asked a few Lao-speakers 73 
to stay behind to help negotiate—to help deal with the new government, which wasn't a 74 
government.  It was a strange situation because there was no invasion of Vientiane in 1975, in the 75 
spring of '75.  Rather there were spontaneous demonstrations before each ministry, and each 76 
minister and his staff bugged out one by one and the government just sort of fell apart in pieces.  77 
And the problem that the AID bureaucracy faced, the embassy faced and that USAID/Laos faced 78 
was abandoning millions of dollars of AID assets in the face of what?  No overt hostilities like the 79 
fall of Saigon.  So we had to stay there—although the USAID families had been put under house 80 
arrest at the housing compound north of Vientiane, Kilometer 6—nobody could leave, nobody 81 
could get in.  So our group of 20-odd Lao speakers helped to negotiate the release of the families 82 
during April, May of '75. They were all flown out to Bangkok in late May—not only the families, but 83 
their personal property.  Marxist theology holds that state property is one thing.  Personal property 84 
is something else.  So people packed out their personal belongings and everybody got flown out to 85 
Bangkok. Our small group of Lao speakers stayed behind and negotiated the termination of the AID 86 
program. We had to demonstrate to Washington that there was a real threat, that we weren’t just 87 
walking off and abandoning a program because of a few demonstrations.  So it was a very unusual 88 
situation. I was not a witness to the Hmong evacuation from Long Tieng.  I had been involved in a 89 
lot of other refugee evacuations in northern Laos and northeastern Laos.  I worked around the 90 
southeastern edge of the Plain of Jars and then later on the Plain of Jars proper.  But the whole 91 
debacle at Long Tieng, I wasn't a witness to that.  But—so after Laos fell, we all got reassigned back 92 
to Washington and then I followed Jiggs Weldon to Haiti.  He had been reassigned to Haiti, and he 93 
wanted me as his program officer.  So in 1975, I went to Haiti and was there for four years, '75 to 94 
'79.  And then in '79 got an assignment back to Bangkok working in the Indochina refugee program, 95 
 3 
the Lao section of the Indochina refugee program and worked in that for two years, where several 96 
AID officers, like myself, were seconded to help process refugees, Lao refugees.  And Lao—by Lao, 97 
I mean Lao, Hmong, all the different ethnolinguistic groups coming out of Laos and Cambodia and 98 
Vietnam.  We had Cambodian language officers and Vietnamese language officers.  And they 99 
prepared refugee families for INS interviews for the U.S. refugee program.  And so we visited the 100 
camps, we dealt with the Thai authorities in terms of repatriation and treatment of new arrivals on 101 
the Thai side, and so forth.  So I—the two years of experience with the refugee program, I learned 102 
more—I learned a little about what was going on in Laos post-'75.  And then in '82, two years—'79, 103 
'80, '81—in the refugee program and then one year—one further year in USAID Bangkok, working 104 
in the public health programs of USAID Thailand.  Nothing to do with the Lao refugee program, 105 
strictly the public health, because I had a degree in public health.  Then four years in Washington 106 
and then a return to Bangkok [Chuckles] with AID for five years, working in public health, running 107 
the public health office and a science and technology project that we ran.  So I got back to Laos 108 
once in '91 on an OFDA short-term assignment, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.  A bunch of 109 
ex-Lao hands went back to help do an assessment of a drought and flood in southern Laos and then 110 
I went back in two other consulting jobs.  One was in 1997 doing the socioeconomic impact 111 
assessment of an Asian development bank-sponsored road project from the Thai border at Ban 112 
Huai Sai, northeast to—through Vieng Phu Ka, through Luang Nam Tha to Boten, the Chinese 113 
border town, Route 3 or 3A.  And five years later in 2002, that same team went back and redid that 114 
whole feasibility study on the same road project.  So I spent another—an update of that study.  So 115 
another couple months on that road, which I'm happy to say is now paved and open.  Not officially 116 
opened, but a friend of mine, the head of the Lao service of RFA just drove it, and she said it's great.  117 
Three hours to the border.  That's a very good resource, by the way.  I don't know if you know the 118 
Radio Free Asia, RFA, in Washington. 119 
No. 120 
They had a Lao service and they're very, very well informed.  They're very knowledgeable about—121 
they have—they have sources in Laos, sources in the U.S., of course.  They run a top-notch news 122 
program.  They broadcast twice daily Lao.  And very well informed. 123 
I will look into them. 124 
Yeah, it's rfa.org—Radio Free Asia—rfa.org.  And the Lao section is run by a brilliant woman—125 
Vieng Say Luong Khot—[spells it] it's Vieng Say Luong Khot. 126 
L-u-o-n-g K-h-o-t. 127 
Yeah, Vieng Say Luong Khot.  She was, at a very young age, the—what the rank?  It's called—she 128 
was not minister, but she was like secretary general of the ministry of education of the Lao 129 
government.  They were in Haiti when we were in Haiti by coincidence and we used her for all our 130 
French translations because her French was better than the Haitians.  [Interviewer laughs]  Brilliant 131 
girl—woman.  Anyway, Vieng Say is phenomenal source for things Lao and Hmong.  And they 132 
have—RFA is on the web, so you can … 133 
 134 
(17:36)  When we're done I'll go find an Internet cafe and go check it out. 135 
Yeah, anyway, so how did we get on Vieng Say?  Oh, the road.  So the road's finished.  So I haven't 136 
been back since 2002.  I'll probably go back around—we have some friends coming.  I'll probably go 137 
back December.  But Laos still has a special place in my heart.  I mean, it's gorgeous, as you know.  138 
It's spectacular.  It's really beautiful. 139 
I'd been there for all of one day before this trip, passing through, talked to people like Jim 140 
Chamberlain and Mike Carroll.  I went back this time to try to sort of unofficially conduct 141 
some interviews with people and realized that would only go so far.  And so now Jim's trying 142 
to see if I can wrangle either some sort of official permission or an invitation from the 143 
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university to come and do it the right way.  But yeah, I mean, I didn't travel too far—144 
Vientiane and parts outside.  I went up to Xieng Khouang for two days, but it's gorgeous. 145 
Yeah, Jim is the man.  He's really brilliant.  He's unreal.  Fine. 146 
Yeah, a great bonus is he’s personable as well.  I mean, a lot of brilliant people I know won't 147 
give you the time of day and Jim really did. 148 
I hope he's given you files—the files of his studies that he's done because they just—they're … 149 
I'll have to ask. 150 
They're amazing.  They're amazing.  I mean, I have them.  If you want them, I'd be happy to copy 151 
them for you.  I mean, they're just—I wish he would lose some weight because we can't afford to 152 
lose him.  That guy's a walking encyclopedia. 153 
Absolutely.  He was unfortunately a lot busier than he planned to be … 154 
He's always—yeah.  Well, yeah.  I mean, if you really want definitive answers to things, he's your 155 
man. 156 
Well, whenever you finish your tea, I think we might almost be better off back by the desk 157 
where we were, just because of all the road noise here, but we can carry on for as long as we 158 
need to here. 159 
OK.  I can—we can take this. 160 
Oh, well maybe that's not such a bad idea. 161 
Let me try to pay. 162 
Yeah, and I'll just turn this off for—well, we can wait until they show up.  You never know 163 
when that will be. 164 
They're around the corner. 165 
OK.  I'll just turn … 166 
 167 
 168 
[New track begins] 169 
 170 
(0:00)  … Well, if you don't mind, let's go back to your first tour of—with IVS in '62. 171 
Sure. 172 
How much of an orientation were you given about what you were going to be encountering 173 
in Laos before you actually went? 174 
None. 175 
None.  So you literally hit the ground and knew nothing about the country, its history, its 176 
people, pretty much nothing. 177 
Only except what I read myself. 178 
[Re microphone:]  Sorry, it's drooping on me. 179 
Yeah, OK.  There was no—there was no—there was no even interview.  Just—they wanted warm 180 
bodies. 181 
So what … 182 
The paperwork had a big stamp on it that said, ‘Vietnam Special.’  [Interviewer guffaws] 183 
That sounds good. 184 
Yeah, OK. 185 
So what was your learning process then, as you arrived and what kinds of things were you 186 
doing? 187 
Well, we decided—well, I went there with a Martin Klish, who ended up killed in a plane crash.  The 188 
few of us that arrived at roughly that same time.  There were two teams—education team which 189 
taught at Dong Dok University at Kilometer 9 and then the rural development team, which I was 190 
part of.  And there was not a big organization.  Maybe 40 or 50 people, I guess.  Don't—I'm not 191 
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sure of that number, but—and so the first thing was to learn Lao.  And we discovered there were no 192 
materials except a course written by a missionary in Luang Prabang, but it taught the unusual dialect 193 
of Luang Prabang.  And so we wrote our own course and learned it at the same time.  So we wrote 194 
lesson by lesson with several Lao colleagues, one of whom ended up as the head of the Lao section 195 
for the Foreign Service Institute.  I had a career in teaching Lao to foreigners for the State 196 
Department.  So that took several months.  And then the first sort of real work was—I was a 197 
musician and I wrote arrangements for the marching band of the depart—you asked about what sort 198 
of training or orientation were we given.  We were sort of left to do whatever you want to do.  So I 199 
wrote some charts for this band, which couldn't play a thing—and—except for a couple ringers who 200 
were Vietnamese.  And this was the secret police marching band.  This was Phoumi Nosavan's 201 
department of national coordination band.  And so that's national development, right? 202 
 203 
(3:45)  Works for me.  I played in the band from grade school all the way through college. 204 
OK.  So then I went up to Luang Prabang and taught at a teacher training school.  I taught hygiene, 205 
I taught geology.  And another IVS guy, a friend of mine, we wrote a book of Lao songs with a 206 
Catholic priest who was an organizer and got it published.  Transcribed—I did the transcriptions 207 
and my—other people did the lyrics and the transcriptions for the lyrics and so forth and taught 208 
school for a few months.  And [Pauses] did that shoot the year?  That year went by pretty fast.  At 209 
one—at a certain point, I came back to Vientiane and I can't—oh, we worked in a vegetable 210 
program on the Vientiane Plain to try to grow vegetables so that all the morning market produce 211 
didn't have to be imported from Sisieng May from Vietnamese—refugees from Dien Bien Phu who 212 
lived across the Mekong river in Sisieng May, Thailand.  Crop substitution—or not a crop 213 
substitution, but an import substitution program, working with the Department of Agriculture.  But 214 
it was just sort of a little bit of this, a little bit of that.  And then I started—then I heard that I was 215 
going to be assigned to Sam Thong and I went up for a visit for a day or two, started studying 216 
Hmong in the evenings, went on home leave—or leave and then came back and then was assigned 217 
to southern Laos.  So I was in southern Laos for a full year on the Bolovens Plateau.  And there we 218 
built a bunch of dispensaries and set up a re-supply program for some rural dispensaries with—all 219 
part of Dr. Weldon's public health operation.  And got some ag guys and put in some demonstration 220 
gardens and sort of muddled around, did surveys—a lot of surveys, which amounted to 221 
ethnographic stuff. 222 
 223 
(6:35)  So you were finding out who was living where and what they needed or … 224 
Yeah.  Yeah.  And there were 44 villages down there, two different linguistic groups.  And that was 225 
really interesting.  I mean, they were very interesting people.  They were Mon Khmer people.  And 226 
so … 227 
 228 
(7:08)  How much did the war sort of intrude on what you were trying to do in these first few 229 
years? 230 
In—the war—the first year in Vientiane and Luang Prabang, very little.  In southern Laos, we—231 
there—we knew how far—where we could go and where we could not go—that is the eastern part 232 
of the Plateau was where we were—it was safe.  The central part, there were some places that one 233 
was not sure about.  And the area under that administrative jurisdiction, these 44 villages, they were 234 
on—they were on the government side, if you will.  And—but then off the edge of the Plateau to 235 
the east, that was part of the—what developed into the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  And there were CIA 236 
case officers working in those areas, developing home guard and ADC units—this Auto Defense de 237 
Choc, the early home guard.  But never saw any action during my time in IVS.  Heard about people 238 
getting shot up and there were plane crashes and so forth.  And a good friend of mine that was a 239 
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case officer got killed in a silly chopper crash.  But the war—really didn't have any real close 240 
exposure to the war until I came back in '66 and went up to Sam Thong and … 241 
 242 
(9:01)  Did they give you any information about the war, though, just for your own benefit or 243 
your own… 244 
We worked very closely with the CIA across the valley—there were two valleys, one at Long Tieng 245 
where they ran the war, and our valley of Sam Thong, we picked up the pieces.  The CIA folks at 246 
Long Tieng and we were close personally and socially and went back and forth and saw each other 247 
all the time and made it a point to find out what the hell was going on, and where to go or not to go, 248 
and what we could expect and so forth.  And so—and we were all sort of part of the effort.  So we 249 
learned perforce what was happening.  We had to know what was going on. 250 
 251 
(9:47)  How—I think it's very easy for kids who grew up post-Vietnam, post-Laos war to 252 
sort of look back and see IVS and USAID as just sort of another phase of the American war 253 
movement.  Well, maybe not war movement, but war effort in this era. 254 
You can interpret it that way.  Certainly one of the great attractions from USAID’s budgetary 255 
standpoint was that here, for 80 bucks a months, were extra people that could help implement AID 256 
programs like the Village Cluster Program. Houei Khong was an administrative region on the 257 
eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau where I worked for a year—'63 to '64.  Our community 258 
development work in Houei Khong became designated a village cluster program.  Here were 44 259 
villages and the idea was to do a bunch of basic community development activities -  agriculture and 260 
public health and roads.  We had an IVS engineer and some Thai contractors building roads to 261 
develop the area and try to increase affinity for the government side by producing tangible 262 
development results.  Put in schools and so forth. We never saw much, if any, of the documentation 263 
that described this glorious effort, the Village Cluster Program, the an official AID designation.  And 264 
of course, the public health program that Jiggs Weldon set up was an official U.S. government 265 
program.  And we IVS volunteers helped to carry it out.  So were part of the effort.  And we got 266 
caught up in the feeling that we were on the right side and that this was all a noble effort and that we 267 
were doing the right thing.  And it was easy in Laos to feel that way because a higher percentage of 268 
the Lao population was killed and wounded than the Vietnamese population.  Moreover, there were 269 
at any one time about 800,000 refugees internally displaced in Laos.  That's a huge percentage.  And 270 
Vang Pao's forces took 10% casualties annually.  We calculated from hospital records and from death 271 
benefit payments that his military and paramilitary forces lost 10% per year.  That's totally 272 
unsustainable.  It's a catastrophe.  So from our perspective, the Vietnamese were bad guys.  They ate 273 
dogs.  Suav tog, the Hmong word for enemy literally means Chinese soldier. And of course, we had 274 
really no idea of what damage the U.S. Air Force was doing.  That didn't come out until much later.  275 
And sitting in a place like Sam Thong—I had a ham radio station, but more importantly, we had 276 
good short wave receivers and listened to the news and listened to what was going on in Vietnam.  277 
The news was very, very disillusioning.  Very discouraging.  [Pauses]  So poor old Laos got caught 278 
up in this mess. 279 
 280 
(14:03)  When you went to Sam Thong for the first time because you thought you were being 281 
assigned up, but ended up not, how long were you there and what kind of initial 282 
impressions of the place did you get? 283 
I was there for just a night—a night, even—I don't even remember—I can't frankly remember 284 
whether I spent the night or not.  It may have been just part of a day.  And it was just this sort of a 285 
casual trip.  I mean, somebody was going—let's go.  It was a Dornier we took.  And the hospital was 286 
a big tent—or no, it was a thatched—bamboo thatched hut, large hut.  The quonset hut was not 287 
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there.  The refugee supplies were also just under thatch.  And it was a dusty strip and it was never 288 
paved.  And it was gorgeous, I mean, really beautiful, this little setting in the bowl of the Sam Thong 289 
valley there.  As it turns out, there are other places that are a lot more beautiful, but—and the 290 
Hmong were fascinating.  I mean, very, very different dress and you can always tell Hmong by the 291 
way they walk.  They walk flatfooted because that's the best way to grab mud with your bare feet and 292 
toes.  I mean, even in the market the Hmong walk with flat feet because that's the way they've 293 
always walked.  Otherwise it’s easy to slip down the hill.  At least the generation of Hmong we knew 294 
walked flatfooted did.  So … 295 
I'll pay attention.  [Chuckles] 296 
It may have been lost in the intervening years. 297 
Well, some of the older folks probably not anyway. 298 
So I—impression—I had a very vague impression, so it was a very quick trip. 299 
Who taught you Hmong back when you were … 300 
Oh, one of Touby Lyfoung's sons—I can't remember his name, who—I hired him privately to—I 301 
wanted to learn this—I wanted to learn the phonetic system, which is really a bear. 302 
 303 
(16:27)  I've taken all of two lessons and then my teacher got too busy, but I hear you. 304 
Fifty-eight consonant phonemes or fifty-three. 305 
Fifty-seven, if I—but anyway, yeah. 306 
Yeah.  And eight tones, one of which is a pre-glottalization, the [kag, kawg].  It’s gorgeous. 307 
And the D. 308 
Oh, it's—oh, well, it's very, very subtle.  It's very subtle.  It's—there are similarities in some Indian 309 
is—that's why the dharma—-d-h—it's that same narrow distinction.  Very tough.  So that was very, 310 
very interesting, but when we got—when I then was assigned to Sam Thong in 1966, Vang Pao said 311 
explicitly, ‘Don't speak Hmong.  This is Laos.  We want all of you guys to speak Lao.  Lao is going 312 
to be the medium of discourse.  And it's what we're going to teach in the schools and that’s it’.  And 313 
so that was the end of my attempt to really get any fluency in Hmong.  Partly I was lazy, but it was 314 
also his insistence that was, ‘You guys, you speak Lao.’ 315 
 316 
(18:04)  Was this something—I mean, did you hear from him directly? 317 
Directly. 318 
So how often did you see him and what were your impressions of him when you were 319 
assigned there? 320 
I saw him more—fairly often because I tended to meddle in [Interviewer laughs]— ‘This is not 321 
right, General.  You've got to do something about it.’  I mean, when we saw—when the Plain of 322 
Jars—when he took the PDJ in 1968, some of the old Chao Muongs, the traditional Hmong 323 
leadership, went out and stole all the cattle from the Lao on the PDJ.  There was a huge cattle rustle, 324 
a buffalo rustle, which we got all indignant about and documented and photographed and reported 325 
in great detail.  And I spent hours with VP describing exactly what was going on.  And there was 326 
that episode and we'd run into him, of course, at Long Tieng, at events, at parties and so forth 327 
and—but, and we'd—I'd point out to him problems with people stealing signals.  That is where you 328 
have a rice drop which depends on the aircraft getting the proper signal on the ground before they 329 
can drop.  And sometimes adjacent resettlement villages will learn what the other site's letter is. 330 
They'll put it out and if the sites are close enough and the pilot isn't sure, the rice drop can be, in 331 
effect, stolen.   It’s petty stuff compared to the larger problems we had to deal with, but it can make 332 
one very indignant.  333 
 334 
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Vang Pao was a natural leader.  I mean, he had a charisma and an ability to endear himself to people 335 
and to make himself feared, if necessary. People knew about the hole in Long Tieng.  If an offense 336 
was serious enough, you got put, and sometimes left, in the hole.  It was like in a dungeon in 337 
Medieval Europe.  You could die there.  And he had people blown away, including this brilliant 338 
linguist that I'm sure you're familiar with. [Shong Lue Yang, described in “Mother of Writing,” by 339 
William Smalley et. al., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990] 340 
I'm not sure I am. 341 
The guy that wrote the … 342 
Oh, [Smalley]?  Not Smalley, but the guy that wrote the book about it. 343 
Yeah.  VP had him killed. 344 
Shong Lue Yang? 345 
I don't know. 346 
Something like that. 347 
I have the book and he was killed.  He was—some of the CIA officers thought that his languages 348 
included Cyrillic characters, which was not the case.  And because he was off by himself—he was 349 
therefore a prima facie suspect as not being part of the team.  And VP had him killed. 350 
They still refer to that script as Communist script.  Vang Pao's men do. 351 
That's interesting.  That was the rationale.  And I visited that—his little—I don't know what to call 352 
it—his hut or his … 353 
Almost a shrine, I suppose. 354 
Shrine or—yeah, it was perfectly round like a beach gazebo that one sees thatched and had these 355 
banners hanging from it and so forth.  And I never met him, but—so VP could instill great 356 
confidence in people.  And he had a terrible problem.  The Hmong are an extremely fragmented 357 
society.  The typical village is six households in size.  It's tiny, which is why you get so much 358 
albinism, so much inbreeding, because when the daughter marries, she loses her clan affiliation.  359 
And so her daughter can marry her sister's son.  So you get a lot of first cousin marriages given the 360 
typically small village size.  And a lot of stillbirth besides albinism.  361 
 362 
It is hard to get the Hmong to agree on anything.  So to bring them together for a common purpose 363 
is really hard. Somehow VP managed to do it.  VP’s original forces were based on the model, really, 364 
that Bill Lair established of the home guard concept, and it worked in the concept of traditional 365 
Hmong society.  Now when Ted Shackley got involved, he just destroyed everything, trying to turn 366 
the Hmong resistance fighters into main force batallions. 367 
 368 
(23:51)  Do you think—I realize you probably don't have first-hand information about this, 369 
but do you think this was his own personal initiative or do you think he was trying to carry 370 
out something that was ordered from above him? 371 
Don't know.  I don't know.  I don't know.  I do know that I heard—I heard one case officer 372 
complaining once about a cable from Washington, from Langley, telling them how to set up a 373 
mortar tube.  He said—it's the classic problem of the headquarters not allowing the field to—like 374 
when the British general during the Revolutionary War, got an order by London by ship to sail up 375 
the Bronx River and capture White Plains.  The Bronx River is this creek about a foot wide that runs 376 
alongside the Hutchison River Turnpike.  But it was on map, you see, in London.  So it's an age—377 
it's a timeless problem.  So I don't know if Shackley was acting on his own, but—and he was trying 378 
to make a name for himself.  I don't know.  I don’t know.  But certain local officers did have 379 
tremendous influence.  For example, [Ambassador G. McMurtrie] Godley bought the Air Force's 380 
line, hook, line and sinker.  Sullivan had kept them out.  Sullivan had—basically knew that they 381 
were—they did more harm than good.  And Godley loved these stereoscopic presentations that the 382 
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Air Force would give with the trucks being blown up and so forth.  So yes, local officers could make 383 
a huge difference.  And Vang Pao himself was not averse to getting out on a limb and hoping that 384 
the U.S. government, the CIA, would back him up on—the retaking of Phou Pha Ti was just insane, 385 
trying to retake Phou Pha Ti was just madness, for example.  And he—we're talking about 386 
leadership now.  He—the CIA used to complain a lot that VP would talk in the clear on the radio, 387 
that he would virtually announce that he was going to attack such-and-such a site tomorrow 388 
morning. Well, with VP it was partly a game of bravado and bluff and, as it turned out, the CIA had 389 
cracked the Pathet Lao codes, which were pretty rudimentary.  They could  read all the PL radio 390 
traffic.  They knew exactly what they were going to do, but the Pathet Lao were always late.  I mean, 391 
you could have all this intelligence, but it was worthless because they never showed up on time. 392 
PL's follow-though was pretty bad. 393 
It was—yes.  So military intelligence is always—it never changes.  It's a contradiction in terms.  But 394 
Vang Pao was an amazing leader.  He had—every year he had an open meeting at Long Tieng where 395 
anybody and everybody could come and raise questions.  It was like Question Time in the House of 396 
Commons.  He was like Solomon deciding.  I'd never forget one episode.  Late afternoon, people 397 
were kind of groggy after a long lunch. Some guy got up and said, ‘Our ducks are dying.  What are 398 
you going to do about all the ducks dying?’  And VP’s immediate response was ‘The goddamn 399 
Chinese and their nuclear testing—the fallout from the Chinese nuclear testing is responsible for 400 
this…” and he just went on and on for about a half hour about—he was brilliant.  He could 401 
improvise and maintain the aura of wisdom and knowledge. 402 
 403 
(28:25)  Do you know who Mike Lynch is? 404 
Not well.  I've met him.  I don't know him … 405 
Mike said that VP liked to act like he knew everything.  If they were showing a movie and 406 
the projector broke down and he knew nothing about projectors, he still went over and tried 407 
to fix it and just sort of jumped into everything. 408 
Sure.  I saw him once.  They were—some refugees had come off the Plain of Jars and we met them 409 
at an artillery position right off the edge up in the hill.  And VP showed up and he went over to the 410 
105 and he didn't—he didn't adjust it using the chronometer wheels the way you'd very carefully 411 
make all these azimuth and elevation adjustments on an artillery piece.  He kicked the support stand 412 
over a little bit and said, ‘Fire again.’  And it was absolutely dead on.  [Interviewer guffaws]  And the 413 
case officers with him just blanched—because this is not the example that you set for the troops, 414 
but that was the way he was.  He, indeed, yeah, he knew everything about everything.  So he was 415 
unique, an amazing guy.  Have you seen, by the way, the court filing that John Keker did in his—416 
John Keker is a world class defense lawyer who successfully prosecuted Oliver North, who was 417 
working pro bono in VP's defense.  And he filed the brief that got VP out of jail, under house arrest.  418 
And he's going to—his—I'll have to send you the—I have the briefs because my brother is a buddy 419 
of—my brother is a lawyer and he's a good buddy of this… 420 
OK. 421 
These are public court documents now.  And it makes—have you ever—did you ever see the actual 422 
charges? 423 
Yes. 424 
I mean, that's a joke. 425 
Oh, and I saw this—what was it called?  ‘Operation Popcorn.’ 426 
Oh, it was a joke. 427 
I know you already have my e-mail, but there it is officially anyway, so you've got it all in 428 
one place. 429 
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So, I mean, the brief is—absolutely destroys.  This is some idiot prosecutor dealing with an idiot 430 
undercover ATF agent.  And they're going to—this case, I mean, I—the prosecutor is insane if he's 431 
actually going to try to bring it to trial.  It will just get destroyed. 432 
Well, given the environment in the country right now, it's probably going to be more of 433 
problem than it should be, but I think you're right.  I mean, it just so clearly seems like a 434 
case of overwrought— 435 
Oh, it's insane.  Part of the defense case is a statement from Bill Lair. 436 
Yes, that I did read.  I think maybe we're on the same e-mail list of Roger Warner because 437 
Roger sent it out. 438 
It could—yeah, I think it could be.  Yeah.  Yeah.  [Laughs] 439 
 440 
(31:46)  One of the other big things that just seems to get blown all out of proportion is the 441 
whole drug thing.   442 
Yeah. 443 
And obviously, opium was a part of Hmong culture.  It was part of Hmong commerce.  And 444 
Vint Lawrence, I think, early—I forget exactly when this remark was made, but he was 445 
basically saying to VP, we are going to leave someday, which he said was kind of Bill Lair’s 446 
mantra to his staff.  He said it's a matter of time before the States will leave.  We need to 447 
train the Hmong people and get them ready to take care of themselves.  And Vint Lawrence 448 
said on one occasion that, when he said this to Vang Pao, he said, ‘Yeah, I know.  That's 449 
why I have all this opium under my house.’  That to him it wasn't, of course, the means by 450 
which he was going to start a regional drug business and make money, but it was a way to 451 
make sure that he could pay his troops once American resources dried up.  But just based 452 
on your experience with the Hmong, how would you describe to an uninitiated American 453 
the role that opium played in Hmong society and perhaps within the Hmong military as 454 
well? 455 
We permitted Hmong patients to smoke opium in the Sam Thong hospital.  It's a safe analgesic, it's 456 
a traditional medicine.  The Hmong, in general, frown on the use of opium because people can't 457 
work as hard or long.  I mean, they start—an opium user starts taking it to relieve pain typically 458 
associated with hard work.  And so they can indeed work harder for a while.  But, as you know, 459 
when it wears off, the synaptic connections are—the fluid is—the body overcompensates.  And so 460 
things hurt more, sounds are louder, colors are brighter.  Everything is more—the nervous system is 461 
enhanced, which requires a larger dose the next time.  So it's chemically, biologically addictive.  And 462 
an addict can take 100 pipes a day.  It can consume a huge amount of time.  Each pipe takes quite a 463 
while to prepare.  So we saw users—and one of the things that—one of the items that was first to 464 
be liberated when the Plain of Jars was taken were these large copper woks, which were used for 465 
cooking down raw opium into some sort of paste, which are valuable for any kind of cooking, really, 466 
but that had been their main use.  In terms of commerce, my understanding was that we did—we—467 
Dr. Weldon and a remote sensing expert that was part of the USAID mission, a guy named Heng 468 
Thung.  He had a doctorate from Cornell.  He still works in Bangkok. We wanted to get a handle on 469 
opium production in Laos.  And so Heng did an aerial survey, which is the most accurate 470 
methodology —the opium fields have a very distinct photographic signature. We hired airplanes and 471 
did photography and did sample surveys on the ground and so forth.  It turned out that Laos didn't 472 
produce much at all.  Laos was a transit point.  And most of what was produced in Laos was 473 
consumed locally. There was very little export-oriented production.  The great majority of opium 474 
that went through Laos came out of Burma, through northwestern Lao, through Ban Huai Sai, 475 
through Thailand— with its good road network—or from Ban Huai Sai in Lao air force aircraft 476 
dumped into the harbor at Hong Kong.  And the Lao connections tended to be a middle-man 477 
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connection, the Yaothe and then Lao army.  But the Hmong—the opium growing areas of Sam 478 
Neua Province, first of all, were enemy territory since, what—'58, I guess.  Those areas were not 479 
accessible.  So the few fields that were in Vang Pao's control, basically, were consumed at home or 480 
traded in local commerce.  There wasn't any big trade.  And Alfred McCoy did the world a great 481 
disservice by totally misrepresenting—he created this myth, which is complete B.S., but it's now 482 
received wisdom about which movies have been made and therefore it must be true.  And it's just—483 
it's a complete crock that the Hmong financed or that that CIA financed their operations with 484 
opium.  They didn't need to.  They had appropriated funds.  They had U.S. taxpayer money.  And 485 
the story really falls apart as soon as you look at any kind of objective appraisal.  Heng Thung is still 486 
in Bangkok, I think, at ESCAP.  You can probably look him up if you want to. 487 
Well, if he's—I mean, I'm going to be there a relatively short time, but if I can get ahold of 488 
him in advance, maybe I could at least have a phone conversation with him. 489 
Yeah, I might even have his—because he might remember the precise…  Let me see if I have his—490 
try this number for him.  It's a—this is, I think, the ESCAP number—02—in Bangkok—[Mr. 491 
McKeithen gives the interviewer the phone number.] 492 
Heng Thung. 493 
Heng Thung.  He is a Chinese-Indonesian with a doctorate from Cornell in remote sensing.  And he 494 
did this opium survey.  A fascinating guy.  But the conclusion was—in fact, the chapter in Jiggs' 495 
book about buying the opium crop, I think he gives some data in there on the size. 496 
OK. 497 
And it was … 498 
But it's been awhile. 499 
It was a small amount and it was eminently doable to buy the whole thing because it was a small 500 
harvest.  You can get about a kilo, if you're really lucky, out of a hectare.  That's all.  And Burma, 501 
3,000 tons in a good year?  I mean, that's where it all came from. 502 
And, I mean, by the time of the war, it had really lost its place as sort of a medium through 503 
which to pay taxes. 504 
U.S. government—yeah, if it ever was.  The French—I don't know that situation.  I mean, the extent 505 
to which the French actually—I don't know what they were doing with the trade, but … 506 
Well, there are elders I've interviewed and people in their 70s and 80s who say that back in 507 
the day the French would collect taxes in the form of opium.  But that's not to say I 508 
shouldn't … 509 
It's sort of like gold.  It's a, I mean, it had a known value.  It was easily transportable—iron bars, salt, 510 
gold, opium, silver. 511 
 512 
(40:27)  What do you think—this is sort of a question that takes us from beginning to end 513 
and I'll go to go back to the beginning again, but what, as an observer of the Hmong people 514 
do you think you've picked up about them that, say, folks in Minnesota who still may only 515 
know them as the people who live over there somewhere might need or at least should 516 
desire to know about them? 517 
Well, I have to say, first of all, that a lot of what I know about the Hmong culture and belief system 518 
comes from Anne Fadiman's book.  I have to say honestly I learned more from reading her book 519 
than I did living in Sam Thong for five years.  It is a brilliant piece of work.  I mean, the belief 520 
system.  I was a witness to a lot of the ua neeg ceremonies and—but I really didn't know below the 521 
surface of what really was going on.  I mean, I understood the symbolism of the rider and taking the 522 
trip and so forth, but—our electrician was a shaman and he worked on live 220-volt lines all the 523 
time.  [Interviewer laughs]  Yeah, he was a powerful guy.  A little guy—young—a young shaman.  524 
And they, as vessels for traditional knowledge about their world, that is what is in danger of being 525 
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lost.  I mean, here are people that, using this Jew's harp thing can—you can dictate prose and 526 
somebody can perform it and some other guy can write it down. It’s astounding to me to have that 527 
aspect of language.  And their language, after all, is song.  But their knowledge of things in the 528 
woods is just amazing.  I think also their hospitality—well, hospitality is such a universal trait, but I 529 
would be the last person to try to identify some particular trait that I thought was unique. 530 
Well, that's all right.  I just always like to ask to see what … 531 
Yeah.  Yeah. 532 
 533 
(43:31)  Well, let's talk about the operation you stepped into in 1966.  What was going on and 534 
who were some of the major players in that operation? 535 
Well, the refugee program in Sam Thong—Pop Buell was the boss and there were how many 536 
officers?  Let me see.  Don Sjostrom was still alive, Ernie Kuhn, Paul White, Bob Dakan was Luang 537 
Prabang, Mac was in Huai Sai.  There were, what, four—Blaine Jensen, four, five of us in Sam 538 
Thong, I guess.  And we would, when new refugees came out, we would meet them, interview them, 539 
prepare lists of families and get a population count, a quick census and then distribute basic 540 
necessities—blankets, pots, cooking equipment, rice—and establish rice drops. The rice that we 541 
dropped was never enough nutritionally.  It was about half the daily caloric requirement—500 grams 542 
per person per day of milled rice.  The military got 800 grams per person per day.  But you really 543 
need about 1,000 if rice is your only source of carbohydrate.  But we also dropped canned meat and 544 
protein supplement and other stuff.  And so we provided support—food support and medical 545 
support to existing resettlement villages, setting up, starting new villages, keeping track of people 546 
that moved.  Preparing for moves if an area was untenable.  Do you evacuate now?  Do you wait?  547 
Wait until people have to walk out?  Do you move the children and the elderly and can you get the 548 
aircraft to do it and so forth?  And it's unusual for—I mean, several times I went down to the 549 
director, the USAID director and said, ‘We need 10 choppers for several days to move these people 550 
off of a ridgeline.  They're going to get overrun.’  And he said, ‘Yes.’  And so there was always 551 
something happening, but we were dealing with refugee movements of not just Hmong, of course, 552 
but all of the Lao, the Hmong, the other groups up there that were being displaced by the 553 
Vietnamese. 554 
 555 
(46:32)  Well, Mac and Ernie are probably the two people who have said this most loudly, 556 
but I mean I think it's an important theme in this whole discussion.  And that is, as you just 557 
said, it's not just the Hmong.  The Hmong seemed to have received the lion's share of 558 
attention from scholars and from people writing about the Secret War, but what would you 559 
like to share about other groups of people that you worked with, just regarding your 560 
observations of what they went through and how they contributed to this effort? 561 
Oh, the leadership on the Lao side was great.  I mean, both the military—the captain & major rank, 562 
light colonel rank, the Chao Muongs, Chao Kuangs, the people we worked with.  There were some 563 
good, some bad.  But because the civilian leadership maintained the traditional structure of the 564 
province and the district and so forth, and because this leadership tended to be Lao or Phuan, we 565 
dealt with them more than we did with the Hmong.  And so we had more substantive interaction 566 
with non-Hmong than we did with Hmong in terms of where should the village be relocated and—567 
unless it were purely a Hmong village, of course, then—and what's happening on the other side and 568 
when might somebody be coming out and so forth.  And in fact, on the military side, as you 569 
probably heard, the Lao became some of the crack, some of the very best military units.  Some very 570 
good CIA case officers were able to train some Lao battalions that took on amazing odds. 571 
 572 
(48:38)  I don't think you hear that often enough. 573 
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No. 574 
I think it's quite often the case that people say, ‘Well, the Hmong were the only good 575 
soldiers and the Lao were terrible.’ 576 
No, no.  Yeah.  No, it was all a function of training and leadership and support.  There was a black 577 
Special Forces retiree named Will Green, called Black Lion, who trained a bunch of troops out of 578 
Savannakhet and brought them up.  And then held on half a North Vietnamese division.  They were 579 
incredible.  And Duang Tha and other people that Jiggs Weldon writes about in his book were very 580 
good, very good military leaders.  And VP relied on them heavily.  So then they were fighting for 581 
local territory and protecting their local areas.  The Lao military at the higher levels was hopelessly 582 
corrupt, except for some, like Colonel Chansom, who was our regional deputy.  He was Vang Pao's 583 
deputy.  He was very good.  So, no, it's very important to keep in mind that the Hmong were just 584 
one of many groups that were doing a good job. 585 
 586 
(50:10)  Did you work with Chao Saykham at all? 587 
Oh, a lot.  Oh, yeah. 588 
I think he's another underrepresented individual in all of this.  What can you tell me about 589 
him? 590 
He was widely respected.  He knew the limits of the Lao government's ability, both national and 591 
local to do anything.  He often said, ‘If you're going to give aid, if you're going to build a bridge, 592 
build it yourselves.  For God sakes don't give the Lao the money.’  He was a very savvy leader and 593 
very helpful in addressing our concerns when we thought something was wrong.  And he would let 594 
us know what was really going on or do something about it.  And he was good. 595 
Now, I think I got this from Jane Hamilton-Merritt's book, so I can't—that may not be 596 
right.  But was he also one of the people who sort of supported the effort to educate young 597 
women? 598 
I can't say for sure.  I think—it certainly - it certainly would be consistent with his—the sort of a 599 
man he was.  He was an enlightened fellow.  He—but I can't point to any—but I wouldn't be 600 
surprised at all.  And—because his—let's see, his niece, that Ernie married, she was a teacher. 601 
Phaythune. 602 
Yeah.  And then, his wife—was she involved in the ministry of education?  I can't recall, but … 603 
 604 
(52:13)  Did you have many dealings with Touby Lyfoung? 605 
I met him a couple times.  No, his son was the one that tutored me in Hmong.  And I studied at 606 
their house in Vientiane.  And so occasionally I saw him, but it was pretty rare.  So I didn't know 607 
him. 608 
When you read Doc Weldon's book, you certainly get this sense of adventure or crisis or 609 
whatever you might want to call it that, as you described, you have to sort of meet these 610 
refugees as they're fleeing—the village is no longer safe—provide them with healthcare, 611 
provide them with rice drops.  There must have been a wide variety of ways in which you 612 
had to encounter these people.  Can you talk a little more specifically about the operation as 613 
it may have played out in any of a number of different circumstances? 614 
Yeah, we'd hear about—someone would come into the office or call on the radio and say, ‘Forty-615 
eight new families have shown up at X.’  And so Pop would assign one of us and one of our 616 
counterparts.  We always had a—we had four or five—they were all Hmong, young—or elders.  617 
These were traditional—they call them naikongs.  We'd always travel with one of these guys and go 618 
and find out what was going on.  In some cases, they were young, like Her Tou or—and … 619 
I think this [the microphone] is about ready to slip off. 620 
Sorry. 621 
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Oh, don't—it's gravity at work.  What can you do? 622 
So they would—they did all the work.  They would go out and ask all the questions and have—623 
whatever leadership was there, they would show them how to prepare population lists and identify 624 
what was needed.  And then we'd call back or go back and prepare the material that was needed.  625 
And so you'd find out—you'd find out various ways, when new groups showed up or people 626 
thought they had to leave and it was—it was a very fluid situation. 627 
 628 
(54:47)  Were these normally relocations that lasted only a short time, or were there at least 629 
some cases where individuals could actually at least for, say, two, three years, put some 630 
roots and grow some of their own food? 631 
That was rare.  That was rare.  That was the ideal, but that, in fact, turned out to be pretty tough.  632 
That was always the objective to try to get in a crop.  But it—I'm trying to think of—there were 633 
some, in the Muong Cha Valley, Site 191 and 192, in that area, there were some Lao from north, 634 
from Sam Neua, who had been there several years, a couple years, who had been able to grow 635 
paddy.  But that was not the norm.  And it was hard finding places where, particularly for swidden, 636 
where it was cultivable and the timing was right.  And people wanted to be near a strip or a place 637 
where they could build a strip or a road, but those were almost non-existent.  So we found out 638 
different ways—we tried not to be surprised, but I remember one surprise east of the Plain of Jars, 639 
Site 232, I think, the CIA started getting some—noticing some radio traffic that they just couldn't 640 
figure out.  And it turned out it was a bunch of Khmu that were running their own operations 641 
against the Vietnamese, on their own.  And they had come up with some radios somehow.  And 642 
eventually Vang Pao and his guys went out and talked to them and they joined the fold.  But that 643 
was a surprising development. 644 
 645 
(57:30)  Well, there have been a lot of stories told about Pop Buell.  How did you see him 646 
and how well do you think he fit the operation that he was in charge of? 647 
He was—he got along well with the Lao and the Hmong.  He drank a lot and he could chat—he 648 
was a good B.S. artist.  And he really loved those people—he internalized their cause.  And he was 649 
the antithesis of a bureaucrat. His prose was legendary. Charlie Mann, on more than one occasion, 650 
ordered our secretary to not correct Pop's spelling or punctuation.  He wanted to see the raw 651 
product.  He didn't want to miss any nuance.  And Pop could be frustrating and full of beans.  But 652 
he was not a linear thinker.  He was an intuitive guy and was usually right.  And he was a good judge 653 
of people.  You never quite knew how much to believe of what he said, but that's true of a lot of 654 
traditional leaders in Asian societies -- they don't want to be transparent.  A good traditional Asian 655 
leader maintains an aura of wisdom and knowing things that those below him can't be expected to 656 
possibly understand.  And so therefore you take it as an article of faith.  Paul White, on his first visit 657 
to Sam Thong, was told by Pop, if I'm not misquoting Paul.  He said, ‘Walk right behind me.  658 
You've got to be careful of the mines.’  And they were walking down to the market in Sam Thong.  659 
So … 660 
 661 
(1:00:24)  Paul didn't tell [me] that story.  He told a few other—he said Pop's favorite phrase 662 
was there's no fool like an educated fool. 663 
Yeah.  Yeah. 664 
I also heard it said that he didn't really mind if people thought that he worked for the CIA.  665 
Maybe he even cultivated that image, at least to some people. 666 
Well, his knowledge of the CIA was a very local Long Tieng knowledge and those were good, 667 
generally, good guys.  Vint Lawrence was a peach, whom I didn't—I met years later, but I didn't 668 
know him.  You know his wife, Anne Garrels. 669 
 15 
Yes.  I listen to her regularly. 670 
Yeah.  Yeah. 671 
In fact, that's how I found him. 672 
Oh, through her. 673 
Yes.  Oh, Zalin Grant's book called Facing the Phoenix, where I first saw Vint Lawrence's 674 
name and did the usual web search to see what I could find.  About the only thing that's on 675 
the web about him was that he served in the CIA and he's married to Anne Garrels. 676 
Interesting.  [Laughs] 677 
So I literally, as a faithful Public Radio listener, I thought, ‘Well, what the heck?’  I'll—so I 678 
sent a request to the Public Radio relations office and just said, ‘Here's who I'm looking for.  679 
I understand he's married to your correspondent Anne Garrels.  If you wouldn't mind, could 680 
you pass on a message to her to see if maybe her husband would be willing to speak to me.  681 
And that person did and she did and I was amazed it all worked out. 682 
Yeah, that's good.  Yeah.  That's good. 683 
 684 
(1:02:11)  Did you see much of Bill Lair when he'd come up to … 685 
Almost none.  I barely—I may have met him.  I know I was in the same room with him.  But I 686 
didn't know him. 687 
But officially, of course, he was never there anyway. 688 
I guess.  I guess.  I had met—I had met Pat Landry up there.  I had met some of the Udorn people.  689 
But generally, we only knew the local folks and really didn't know beans about that level of the 690 
operation.  Didn't know—it wasn't until late in the game that I learned what the road-watch teams 691 
were about, because pilots never talked about this stuff.  And in fact, most—the pilots who flew 692 
those radio relay ships, they were never up country.  They never spent the night up country.  So on 693 
occasion, a helicopter pilot that had run one of these infils or exfils would talk about it, but that was 694 
rare.  They usually didn't talk about it.  They'd talk about it in the sense of pilots telling flying stories.  695 
And I listened to a lot of those, because I learned to fly there and I got a lot—I spent a lot of time 696 
with the pilots.  I ended up with a commercial license from all this time I got in Laos.  Because I 697 
flew everything and just to be able to get something back on the ground if the pilot got shot, 698 
because that had happened.  And so eventually I started logging the time and the guys who were 699 
current instructors signed off on it.  And I took it all back to the FAA and they said, ‘This is 700 
perfectly valid time.’  All I had to do was take the writtens and flight checks and I got a free 701 
commercial ticket with an instrument rating.  Pretty good deal.  I could have gotten a rotary wing 702 
rating, but I couldn't afford to rent the thing—the chopper for a check run.  And what are you going 703 
to do with it anyway, right, unless you have it rich uncle.  But I did buy a Maule.  I did own an 704 
airplane for a while and took the family around Haiti in it.  It was great fun.  But I learned with the 705 
best. 706 
 707 
That's what it sounds like.  I mean, it sounds like this was kind of rare breed operating. 708 
They're survivors and everybody taught you something different.  So part—a lot of my recollection 709 
of working in Laos was the enjoyment that I got out of learning to fly, both the choppers and the 710 
Porter and the Helio, the fixed-wing aircraft, the light aircraft.  And it was a—it was a lifelong 711 
experience.  I mean, I don't fly anymore here.  It's too expensive and too complicated.  But it was a 712 
great skill and they were absolutely the best—Al Rich always made me do wheel landings.  He said, 713 
‘Sometime you're going to need it.’  And sure enough, I sold my airplane in Haiti to some medical 714 
missionaries.  They had to fly frozen vaccine around.  And I made the mistake of trying to teach 715 
them how to fly the airplane.  And I'm not an instructor.  And I let one guy get away too soon and 716 
he busted a tail wheel.  So we had to go back to Port-au-Prince with no tail wheel.  But Al Rich had 717 
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told me how to make wheel landings.  That's all you need.  So everybody taught you some other 718 
trick.  Very, very useful.  Valuable. 719 
 720 
(1:06:20)  Now is Al Rich still living? 721 
I don't think so. 722 
OK.  I met Les Strouse.  I've corresponded with Dave Kouba.  I think those are probably the 723 
only sort of regular—I've talked to Heine Aderholt and mostly he just flew missions if he 724 
flew at all in the region.  Dave Kouba, as you may know, made an audiotape of May 12-14 of 725 
'75 when the evacuations had taken place.  I'll send you the transcript I made.  He gave me 726 
a copy and said, ‘I've always wanted this transcribed.’  I said, ‘Shoot, you gave me the tape, 727 
I'll be happy to do it for you.’  So I'll send you a copy. 728 
Oh, thank you. 729 
My pleasure.  My pleasure. 730 
Oh, yeah.  Because I was not there. 731 
Well, it was very helpful because if you read all the different accounts of the evacuation, it 732 
just doesn't add up.  There are some inconsistencies and you wonder, ‘OK.  How many trips 733 
did the C-130 really make?’  And I think there's still questions about how many people you 734 
can really fit on a C-130.  But the tape really helped bring a lot of those pieces in focus.  So it 735 
was very helpful and quite interesting. 736 
How many roughly were evacuated from Long Tieng?  Do you know? 737 
You hear everything from 2,000 to—I know the upper number is impossible, but there are 738 
actually some people that say 10,000.  I'm guessing it's more like 2,500, maybe 3,000 tops.  739 
But I can't imagine it was much more than that.  And I know Les Strouse said they came 740 
back a third day, but things—it was just mayhem.  They tried to throw the kicker off the 741 
plane, so he finally just basically blew the engines, scared people off and they took off with 742 
an empty plane. 743 
Wow. 744 
 745 
(1:08:18)  Well, let's turn our attention to Doc Weldon himself.  He seems, in many ways, an 746 
embodiment of a lot of what USAID really accomplished in the country and sort of was an 747 
inspiration to a lot of the staffers in USAID about what they could do sort of for the people 748 
they were working with.  How would you describe him and sort of his leadership style? 749 
He was a real innovator.  When he was assigned to—he invented a model of—a method of 750 
healthcare delivery that the University of Hawaii later picked up and called the Medex—M-e-d-e-x—751 
program without giving him any credit.  Basically, this was during his time in Samoa, when they had 752 
to deal with intestinal parasites and some other problems that were manageable.  But to do it you 753 
needed good community organization and you needed auxiliary personnel like women's groups to 754 
help to organize the clinics and vaccinations and the taking of anti-worm medicine and so forth.  755 
And then he quickly figured out in Laos what was needed in two completely different settings.  One, 756 
the urban hospital environment for which he brought this operation or used—expanded the 757 
Operation Brotherhood Filipino medical system or staff in the urban areas.  And in the rural areas, 758 
he created this rural dispensary system which was really brilliant.  It provided the basic health 759 
interventions for both civilian and military.  Simple—a simple list of essential things like soap and 760 
anti-malarials and disinfectants and bandages and so forth.  I mean—and the training programs and 761 
the retraining programs and the—you asked about his management style.  The brighter medics then 762 
became supervisors and they became regional supervisors. It was a merit and performance-based 763 
system that he put in place.  And he tended to be a hands-off administrator.  He was not a control 764 
freak.  And he let his—he hired several ex-Special Forces medics like Steve Schofield and Don 765 
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Dougan, and some Thai medics as well, ex-military medics, and ran a good program.  And the 766 
nursing program in Sam Thong was a great program.  So he—his management style was pretty laid 767 
back.  His foil was his wife, Pat, who was a terror, who—but she did—ended up doing a lot of the 768 
budgeting and so forth.  And when I was working, doing their program, their program documents 769 
for them and one year she walked in the office and said, ‘Here's my annual budget.’  And it was this 770 
sort of massive confetti that was—she had a printing—a little old Canon calculator and it would 771 
print out a little strip at the top.  And I got this ball of paper strips from her.  ‘Here.’  That was 772 
typical.  But he, because he—because of his strong military background, he could deal with the 773 
military folks on their terms and they trusted him instinctively.  He was a pilot, of course, and so the 774 
pilots bend over backwards for anything he wanted.  But bureaucratically, he was very savvy.  And 775 
he was very effective. 776 
 777 
(1:13:45)  I've never really understood—maybe it was just a matter of personality, maybe—778 
it's hard to say.  But it seems to me that just about any Hmong of a certain age knows who 779 
Pop Buell was.  It's not the same for Doc Weldon.  And I've always wondered why, because 780 
it seems to me he was every bit if not more important to their survival, to their well being. 781 
I think it was because he wasn't there as much.  Because Pop was there all the time.  Now Doc had 782 
to spend a lot of time in Vientiane and in other parts of Laos.  Pop was in northern Laos the whole 783 
time, specifically the Xieng Khouang area.  But Jiggs also had to work in Huai Sai, in Luang Prabang 784 
and so forth.  And he ran—he had to deal with the urban hospital program, had to deal with the 785 
ministry a lot.  And he ran a big office in Vientiane.  And—but Pop was on the ground all the time.  786 
So it could be just the amount of time and I'm speculating … 787 
Sure. Well, that makes as much sense as anything. 788 
… but Jiggs was the original Da Vinci universal man.  He was a—his unit, when they hit Guam, had 789 
something like 180% casualties.  They were all killed.  And they were pinned down.  They had lousy 790 
intelligence.  They were pinned down on a beach that was supposed to be a gentle drive.  Instead it 791 
was 100-foot limestone bluff with automatic weapons.  They never got up.  They were relieved by 792 
another unit.  From there, to start out with that and he worked on oil rigs in Texas and studied 793 
petroleum engineering, then medical school.  But he was a mathematician, he was a linguist, he was a 794 
pilot, he was an electronics technician.  He knew radios.  He was—he wrote computer programs.  795 
He was a master carpenter, master cabinetmaker, made gorgeous furniture and stuff.  He had—he 796 
did his own well drilling up here because the locals couldn't drill wells fast and he built his own rig.  797 
He could do anything.  Any question about anything you could ask him and if he didn't know, he'd 798 
figure it out.  He was unreal.  He was a scuba—he scuba dived for two years in the Philippines until 799 
he just got sick of it.  But he did—incredible guy.  It's amazing. 800 
 801 
(1:16:50)  What was it, do you think, that people like Steve Schofield, who came in with this 802 
SF experience brought to the medical mission? 803 
They knew—he had worked with several different ethnolinguistic groups in Vietnam and across the 804 
border in Laos.  So he had that experience of working already—having worked with that—with this 805 
type of people.  So he was comfortable from that sense.  And he was tireless.  And he—I'm 806 
speculating now that here, he's no longer a warrior, but he's involved in development and relief.  807 
And maybe it was a more rewarding position to be in than trying to stay alive.  But he was just a 808 
great guy, which is really important.  And so—and I don't know much about what he did in 809 
Vietnam.  I mean—and neither he nor Don talked much about their previous—Don Dougan—their 810 
previous lives.  And there was one other ex-Special Forces medic.  [Tries to remember his name]  811 
That's terrible. 812 
Well, Steve may have mentioned him.  I'll have to look. 813 
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Have you seen Steve and Don in the course of this? 814 
Not Don.  I don't even know where he lives. 815 
Florida, I think. 816 
Oh, really?  OK.  Well, I'm going to be vacationing on the Florida Panhandle in December.  817 
Maybe I'll have to see if I can track him down 818 
Let me see if I have a number. 819 
Steve lives in Sheboygan, Wisconsin and was part of the driving force behind the war 820 
memorial that was built on the lake.  They had a big dedication ceremony with Bill Lair and 821 
Father Bouchard attending.  I think Aderholt would have been there, but his health wasn't 822 
very good.  He's—I think he's 87 years old now. 823 
Don, probably. 824 
No, Aderholt. 825 
Aderholt.  Yeah. 826 
So I met Steve in part because he's a friend of a newspaper reporter in St. Paul who wrote a 827 
week-long series about the 30th anniversary of the fall of Long Tieng. 828 
Oh, really,  Don Dougan.  You can try this.  This is—area code ------------ 829 
OK.   830 
 831 
(1:19:43)  I think Steve said he and Don were the only two people who were stuck in the 832 
USAID compound when the students sort of surrounded it who kept their firearms.  He said 833 
they were ordered to give them up and he said, ‘No way.’  So he and Don sort of patrolled 834 
the perimeter.  He also said unfortunately, as a result of that, they were given the 835 
responsibility for killing all of the pets in the compound before they left, so that couldn't 836 
have been fun. 837 
In the USAID compound.  OK.  Kilometer 6. 838 
Oh, it must have been. 839 
Yeah.  OK.  Yeah.  Oh, that's interesting. 840 
Well, I'll e-mail and tell him you said hello and ask him if he minds if I share his interview 841 
with you.  And I'm sure he won't, but I'll ask him nonetheless and then I'll pass it on to you. 842 
Yeah, sure. 843 
 844 
(1:20:37)  There's a colorful character Steve mentioned and I wonder if you know.  If I 845 
remember correctly, his name is Albert Foure. 846 
Al Foure.  Yes, he was a French mechanic.  He had been—I think he had been in the foreign legion.  847 
At least he—I think he was—had some sort of military position in Laos or Dien Bien Phu.  And 848 
here I'm vague, but it—he ended up at Phonsavan, some at Phonsavan and he had a restaurant—849 
combination restaurant-garage-brothel—is the rumor.  And he became—he was in and out of 850 
Vientiane and we hired him to run our—to be our mechanic at Sam Thong and take care of 851 
generators and vehicles.  And he was an irreverent Breton who loved to tell anti-clerical jokes, 852 
especially in Father B's presence. 853 
Of course. 854 
Because he was a great cook and Father B would always invite himself over for dinner.  So Father—855 
and so … 856 
That was the price of admission, as it were. 857 
Yeah.  So one day—so new refugees had come off the Plain of Jars and Paul White brought back a 858 
Vietnamese woman carrying this passport that said Mrs. Albert Foure in a plastic bag, a bunch of 859 
documents.  And he—we took it to Mr. Foure and said, ‘Is this for real?’  And he said, ‘God, I 860 
thought she was dead.  Bring her out.’  So that was wife number three or something, who had been 861 
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through China, through Russia, to France looking for him and come back and came out as a refugee.  862 
And after meeting her at the airport, she was doing the lunch dishes.  And she stayed, they were 863 
there in Sam Thong.  She was a Sam Thong wife for awhile, but then he said, ‘She's a Communist.’  864 
And so he got rid of her.  And when he—in '75, Mr. Foure applied to go to Australia, but they 865 
wouldn't accept three wives on his application for—his immigration application.  And Steve knows 866 
the details of that and other episodes.  He was a great mechanic, though. 867 
 868 
(1:23:21)  Another name I remember him bringing up is Lee Chai. 869 
Lee Chai?  Lee Chai was his Hmong counterpart, the chief medic on the Hmong side with whom he 870 
worked hand in glove to supervise, resupply the dispensaries—not just the Hmong dispensaries, all 871 
the dispensaries that Steve was working on.  Yeah, he was his counterpart.  They were real close.  872 
Yeah. 873 
 874 
(1:23:53)  So how often would you take off from Sam Thong and go to Long Tieng and have 875 
some sort of social occasion? 876 
If—it was always something.  I mean, I don't know how to—if something—if something had been 877 
organized or planned, we wouldn't go over sort of spontaneously looking to hang around with the 878 
guys because we lived at Sam Thong.  And if we were going over for a party, we'd have to spend the 879 
night there, which, I mean, it was OK.  But it was more often on business.  In other words, stopping 880 
there—if an airplane were going back to Long Tieng, OK, we'll go to Long Tieng and maybe have 881 
some lunch and maybe talk to the boys and see what's going on in the area where I'm working, 882 
what's planned and to tell them what I found out or what I thought about what's happening, what I 883 
saw and try to maintain an exchange of information.  They keep each other informed.  And because 884 
there was so much traffic from Site X or Y back to Long Tieng, not necessarily back to Sam Thong, 885 
you'd go along and then get a ride over to Sam Thong.  So it was a very—it was really, to a great 886 
extent, I mean we saw the need to stay informed and inform them about what we thought was 887 
happening.  So we were there more often on business than socially.  So … 888 
 889 
(1:25:53)  Whenever the words Sam Thong are uttered, of course, people always think 890 
hospital, school, sort of the utilitarian aspect of Sam Thong.  But how was it just as a 891 
community, on its own? 892 
There was an old village north of the strip, which was—had been there for a long time.  I don't 893 
know how long.  But it was sort of an artificial place.  I mean, the Xieng Khouang government 894 
relocated there.  Chao Saykham and so forth were there.  The Military Region 2, the Senatikan, the 895 
general staff headquarters was there.  The official MR-2 military headquarters was there.  And most 896 
of the people there were refugees.  So it was an artificial settlement, like Long Tieng was an artificial 897 
settlement.  And both kept growing during the—because people, particularly military dependents, 898 
wanted to live in Long Tieng or Sam Thong to be close to there, naturally, the headquarters.  So 899 
there was a policy of trying to discourage people from moving to Long Tieng and Sam Thong. 900 
 901 
(1:27:40)  Did you ever spend any time with a Hmong nurse named Choua Thao? 902 
Choua.  Yeah. 903 
She's larger than life.  I mean, she's a tiny woman, but oh, my goodness.  Boundless energy 904 
and very expressive.  She lives in the Twin Cities now.  So I'm just wondering if you had any 905 
remembrances of her from back then. 906 
Nothing substantive.  She was just one of Pop's nurses, one of the girls, one of Dee Dick’s nurses.  907 
But I—nothing substantive, really. 908 
 909 
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(1:28:18)  So you came in '66, had a home leave in '71 before the fall of Sam Thong? 910 
My father died.  I came back for that.   911 
That’s right, I’m sorry. 912 
And I'd been back a couple times before then.  Home leave was every two years.  Yeah.  And then 913 
went back in, I'm going to speculate March or April of '71, back to Ban Xon then.  We set up in Ban 914 
Xon. 915 
 916 
(1:28:55)  Could you tell, say, from the number of dispensaries that were still operating or 917 
not, the number of refugees you had to deal with, the number of rice drops that were 918 
coming, those sorts of things, kind of what was happening with the war in those five years 919 
from '66 to '71? 920 
That's a good question.  I can't really speak with—I can't confirm that there was a big increase in the 921 
program.  I think so, but I just can't cite numbers. 922 
 923 
(1:29:38)  Steve talked about sort of the fortification of Sam Thong.  Was that already 924 
happening before your father died and you left or was that something … 925 
Yes. 926 
OK.  So there was— 927 
Fortification in the sense of there weren't any, really, there weren't any defensive trenches or 928 
perimeters, but every evening for several months an airplane would fly to the sites around there and 929 
around there and just look to see if everything looked OK.  And then we would—we held—we 930 
stood guard among ourselves.  We had guard shifts just around where we lived at night.  So we 931 
were—because we were concerned about being attacked.  But there weren't any real fortifications 932 
that were, that I am aware of, that were put up. 933 
I thought Steve said something about digging a bunker, but I could very well be mistaken.  934 
But we talked about him and Albert sort of guarding the place. 935 
There … 936 
Marching around here and there. 937 
Yeah, they—I'm—there were—because, on that side of the valley where the airstrip was, I don't 938 
recall any bunkers per se.  I don't remember any. 939 
 940 
(1:31:18)  You talked before about Ted Shackley and how his approach to the war was 941 
disastrous in many ways.  How did you see that playing out in the ways that you could 942 
observe—like, for example, maybe casualties coming into Sam Thong, things like that? 943 
Yeah, the creation of these Special Guerilla Units took the Hmong away from their traditional home 944 
guard role, where they're protecting turf, and put them into main force units and it just killed a lot of 945 
people.  I can't cite statistics, but [Pauses] it was—and it was not limited to Military Region 2, but the 946 
same thing happened all over Laos.  Bob Dakin in the Luang Prabang area also talked about what a 947 
disaster it was.  Because these units were supposed to be moved by chopper and go fight the 948 
Vietnamese here, go fight them there.  Just—it's inevitable, the more exposure that one has in that 949 
kind of set piece battle, the greater the casualties are going to be.  So … 950 
 951 
(1:32:45)  It almost seems—and again, perhaps I'm mistaken.  I've talked to so many people 952 
and you get so many opinions, sometimes it's hard to zero in on things.  But it almost 953 
seemed like VP liked having American air support, liked having this large chessboard, if you 954 
will, to play on, was excited about the potential of perhaps using these SGU units to really 955 
sort of push through, at least in the rainy season, when they were more suited to fighting 956 
against the Vietnamese in that way.  Do you think, perhaps, there was—I don't know if 957 
 21 
dependency is the right word, but was this sort of a build-up that may have encouraged VP 958 
to be more bold in the way that he used his men? 959 
I don't know.  I think with respect to air power, I think one can say yes.  That, I mean, he saw that 960 
our air—to him, Lee Lue was the air power, because it was very effective—and some of the A-1s.  961 
The jets were worthless. They couldn't hit anything.  The F-100 series had to drop their first stick of 962 
bombs no less than 10,000 feet AGL or they couldn't pull out if anything hung up.  You can't hit 963 
anything from 10,000 feet.  You can't see—anyway, so, yeah, for air power, VP liked air power.  I 964 
don't know how he felt about the SGU concept.  I don't—I'm not sure. 965 
 966 
(1:34:36)  So how did the situation in Ban Xon differ from that in Sam Thong? 967 
First of all, it was hot, it was low.  It was—it had no charm.  The living was—we worked in air 968 
conditioned trailers.  And I had to fly back to Vientiane every night.  We commuted by air.  It was 969 
drudgery.  So we'd try to spend as much time in the field as possible.  I mean, but, yeah.  And the 970 
situation was not good.  I mean, we were losing.  So it was not like the heady days of '68 when the 971 
Plain of Jars was taken.  And that's when I started studying for the graduate record exam [GRE].  I 972 
was just determined I was going to go—try to get into this—USAID had an MPH program and they 973 
financed my degree at Chapel Hill. 974 
Masters of Public Health? 975 
Which is really nice.  Master of Science in Public Heath.  MPH per se is reserved for MDs.  But non-976 
MDs can get the Master of Science in Public Health.  Same course. 977 
 978 
(1:36:12)  How much did you know about—well, you mentioned Don Sjostrom and 979 
obviously he was killed at … 980 
Na Khang. 981 
Na Khang.  Was he there as a result of sort of a new assignment or was he still working out 982 
of Sam Thong and just happened to be in that place when he was killed? 983 
That was his area of responsibility, the Sam Neua theater or—nobody called it a theater, but Site 36 984 
and the areas before that, which was really before my time, Hong Non and I think Site 86 and 985 
that—he had been working in Sam Neua with the Sam Neua refugees for a long time.  And Na 986 
Khang was where he spent a lot of time because that was where everything ran—was run out of 987 
there at that time.  But he was foolhardy.  I mean, he saved Vang Pao from being killed, probably—988 
Vang Pao got shot up once on a strip and as I understand it, Don grabbed an AK and blew away 989 
whoever was shooting.  And Vang Pao got hit in the arm.  And that's when he ended up back in the 990 
States for recuperation.  But—and so he did indeed save VP's life once.  But he liked to get—he got 991 
shot charging up a hill.  Not smart.  Standing up, charging up a hill.  I don't understand what could 992 
motivate somebody to do that.  But he dragged—there was another story Jerry Daniels told me.  He 993 
indeed dragged some wounded guy back on his back under fire.  And he exposed himself.  Jerry 994 
said, luckily, he just got hit between the eyes.  He never felt a thing.  So he didn't suffer. 995 
 996 
(1:38:36)  How—I'm a little unclear about this.  Maybe you don't know either, but I never 997 
mind asking people to answer questions they may not know—how far back in this operation 998 
did Jerry Daniels go? 999 
[Yawns]  I think, I don't know, I think of Jerry Daniels as someone that I always knew from day one 1000 
at Long Tieng.  So he'd been there, I don't—it's a very good question, but I think it was a long time. 1001 
It sounds like at least 10 years by the time Long Tieng fell.  He probably had been there at 1002 
least nine years if not 10 or more. 1003 
Conceivably.  And then we—and then I really got to know him in the refugee program.  That's 1004 
when we really—I really got to know him well.  Because we would see these guys in passing in Long 1005 
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Tieng and I got to know well a couple of the guys that worked at [Lin Macs], Site 46 because I spent 1006 
some time out there.  And the guys at [Long Che] we'd know in passing and chatting and so forth, 1007 
but extended periods together, those were rare.  But when Jerry worked in the refugee program we 1008 
were working all the time screening refugees. 1009 
  1010 
(1:40:04)  I'll ask you more about him when we get to that then.  You seem to compare two 1011 
of the ambassadors—Mac Godley and Bill Sullivan—in such a way that it sounds like you 1012 
thought Sullivan did a pretty good job of running things and keeping the Air Force in a 1013 
limited role and that Godley sort of unleashed things. 1014 
That's a comment attributed to Sullivan.  He said—who was talking to him that he said, ‘At least I 1015 
kept the Air Force out.’  This is hearsay that Sullivan is alleged to have said that.  But it's a very—it 1016 
stuck with me.  I have no doubt that he said such a thing.  But I don't—what happened at the 1017 
ambassadorial level, that's really a tough one.  I knew [Leonard] Unger socially pretty well.  I didn't 1018 
know Sullivan that well socially.  And Godley was—struck me as a bombast.  A really, really 1019 
important book has never seen the light of day.  His niece, Jinny St. Goar. 1020 
St. Goar? 1021 
J-i-n-n-y.  J-i-n-n-y.  Last name St.—S-t. G-o-a-r. 1022 
Godley's niece? 1023 
Yeah, this is—Mac Godley's sister married—who was a doctor—married a Dr. St. Goar and worked 1024 
out of Harvard or Cambridge or Boston.  And Jinny St. Goar is a journalist who spent—who got 1025 
secret clearance and spent a couple years going through state cable traffic, CIA cable traffic, writing 1026 
the authorized biography of her—of Mac Godley's tour in Laos.  And she's a really careful histo—1027 
I—she interviewed me.  She interviewed Gordon Ramsey.  She interviewed everybody in the world.  1028 
She came out to Air America Association meetings.  She hung out at Lucy's Tiger Den in Bangkok 1029 
and she's very smart.  And I still have a letter of introduction that Mac wrote to the ambassador in 1030 
Malaysia, introducing her, saying something to the effect that Jinny's going to write the real story of 1031 
the great job that our Air Force was doing in Laos.  And I think what happened was that Jinny 1032 
found out the real story of what our Air Force is doing in Laos and Mac wouldn't let her publish it.  1033 
I really think that.  That's pure speculation on my part.  But she spent several years of her life on this 1034 
project.  And it's just—and it's in a black hole someplace.  I have one article, there's one article I 1035 
know of that she did in a compendium with Mac Brown and Joe Zasloff and some other people 1036 
about the Chinese road.  Why were they building the road?  This is the road from the China border 1037 
to Pak Beng, south from Muong Sai, which is now called Udom Xay.  And there was great 1038 
speculation in Washington.  This is an invasion route aimed at the heart of Thailand.  Why are they 1039 
building at such high standards?  Why does it have all these underwater bridges on it and so forth?  1040 
And when I worked for three months in Yunnan on a road project in southern Yunnan and our 1041 
counterparts were the same guys who built the Chinese road in Laos—the Yunnan provincial 1042 
highway department.  And so after we got to know each other I said, ‘Why—what was going on?’  1043 
He said, ‘Well, it was a foreign aid project.  It was a high-priority, high publicity foreign aid project 1044 
that Chou En-Lai and Souvanna Phouma signed up in 1958.  And the deal was we were ordered by 1045 
Beijing to build this road to higher than national standards as a prestige project.  And so we had 1046 
40,000 laborers and 40,000 security personnel and we had 20,000 logistics people and, by god, we 1047 
built this to higher than Chinese standards because—1,000 kilometers of road in northern Laos.  1048 
That was the agreement.  So all these—Muang Sing and Nam Tha and all those roads up there were 1049 
part of the same deal.  These guys were bureaucrats like USAID bureaucrats, building—following 1050 




(1:45:35)  Do you know a guy named Frank Manley? 1054 
Oh, yeah. 1055 
I met Frank in Vientiane and he was telling me a story about, I think, LBJ who apparently 1056 
had made a promise to some Laotian official that USAID was not too pleased about.  I think 1057 
it was something like maybe 100 tractors they were going to bring in or something like that.  1058 
And Frank was hired to do the analysis because, of course, he sold tractors at that time 1059 
amongst, it sounds like, hundreds of other things.  He said, ‘We came back and we 1060 
recommended one kind of tractor throughout the country.  That way you've got no problem 1061 
with parts and interchangeability and all these things.’  He said, ‘Well, USAID decided 1062 
they'd bring in half the number of trucks, five different kinds from five different companies.’  1063 
He said it was a total disaster.  He said that's the way, from his perspective, some of the 1064 
higher-ups in USAID were. 1065 
Oh, the AID procurement system was a catastrophe.  It was really—yeah.  So—let's see, what were 1066 
we talking about? 1067 
The road. 1068 
The road—the road in China.  So anyway, the great Chinese road, the great—the threat of the 1069 
great—hell, in '62, that's when Kennedy sent the Marines—or was it '61?  We got involved in this 1070 
mess because General Phoumi Nosavan lied about Vietnamese troops poised on the border with 1071 
Thailand, at Ban Huai Sai, ready to jump into Thailand.  In fact, they were no more than 50 1072 
kilometers and they weren't Vietnamese.  They were PL.  They had taken Sam Neua and Bien Phou 1073 
Kha and they were up in the mountains, way up northeast of Ban Huai Sai.  Anyway, but Phoumi 1074 
said, ‘They're on the border.  They're going to invade Thailand.’  And that's when JFK dispatched a 1075 
whole bunch of Marines and choppers to Udorn.  That was in the beginning.  That was '61.  This 1076 
was after the Kong Le coup. 1077 
  1078 
(1:47:57)  Hugh Tovar said something about Souvanna Phouma visiting JFK and asking for 1079 
aid as well. 1080 
Could, maybe.  It may well have been.  Hugh was an interesting guy.  Hugh—the impression that 1081 
Hugh made on us in the field, Hugh would—Hugh, on more than one occasion, came up country 1082 
by himself, landed—I was at Phou Kum, Site 50, which is north of the PDJ.  It's in the middle of 1083 
nowhere.  And he just flew up and just hung around and just wanted—and talked for a couple 1084 
hours.  Just wanted to find—just talk.  Here's the station chief talking to slugs in the field.  That 1085 
made a powerful impression. 1086 
So he was the first … 1087 
He was a listener. 1088 
So he was the first station chief to do anything even remotely resembling that. 1089 
As far as I know.  Now I don't know about the guy—a really good friend of Jiggs’—Blaufarb. 1090 
Douglas Blaufarb.  Yeah. 1091 
Yeah.  He had a good reputation, but I never knew him. 1092 
 1093 
(1:49:07)  Yeah, I spent two nights talking over the phone with Hugh Tovar and I think—1094 
well, I think it's six hours altogether and you ask him a question and he just goes.  And his 1095 
hearing may be going a little bit, but his mind is still just unbelievably sharp.   1096 
OK.  So let's see.  Oh, we were talking about Ban Xon.  So this period from the time when 1097 
you have to work further south in hotter and less enchanting conditions and the time of the 1098 
Vientiane Accords, what were those two years like?  And in the wake of what sounds like a 1099 
pretty apparent sign that you were going to be losing the war and this was not going to end 1100 
well, was it a tougher thing to work in an environment like that? 1101 
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 1102 
It was not physically harder, but [Long pause]—oh, it's hard to characterize.  I mean, I still spent a 1103 
lot of time visiting outlying sites and doing sort of normal refugee work.  People came in, they had 1104 
to be taken care of.  There was a monthly rice quota meeting, site by site.  How much did they need 1105 
this month?  And you had to have up-to-date statistics and data on needs and so forth.  And so 1106 
keeping up with the ongoing supply operation took a lot of time.  Now when we got into the time of 1107 
the Accords, we started—some of us were naïve enough to think that there really was going to be a 1108 
functioning government of national union.  And that coincided with the departure of Air America 1109 
and the question then, what happens to the Hmong up there and the other groups up there?  How 1110 
can they fend for themselves?  What kind of development aid can they be provided?  And that's 1111 
when—when I worked in Vientiane from '73 to '75 and was involved in some of those, some of that 1112 
planning aid for—post-war aid, in effect.  And skills training center in Muang Cha, which we built.  1113 
But there were still refugees that needed to be fed.  So—and then I pretty much—then '73 to '75 I 1114 
working mainly in the program office, very little time spent up country, pushing papers for the 1115 
public health program, this—I became the de facto population officer.  We started a national—a 1116 
little family planning program, Maternal Child Health Family Planning Program.  And doing 1117 
paperwork, doing the AID documentation is very time-consuming.  It was just—it's a real 1118 
bureaucratic thing.  So Vientiane politics were more interesting at that point.  And I really, to a great 1119 
extent, lost touch with what was going on up country. 1120 
  1121 
(1:53:11)  Now I should remember this, but Pop Buell had his heart attack … 1122 
His final heart attack. 1123 
I was going to say … 1124 
He had a lot, which—and Jiggs did his medicals to allow him to continue in the foreign service.  1125 
Otherwise he would have been bounced out.  He was visiting Lyle Brown in the Philippines when 1126 
he died.  And he died in the Philippines.  And I don't know, I don't know what year that was. 1127 
 1128 
(1:53:39)  Was it, do you think, kind of a blow to him, physically and emotionally, to have to 1129 
abandon Sam Thong?  Was this … 1130 
Yeah.  Oh, yeah.  Oh, yeah.  That was a big blow. 1131 
And you said he really came to identify with the people.  So I assume also seeing their 1132 
potential fortunes grow dimmer and dimmer had to have been pretty hard on him as well. 1133 
Yeah.  Yeah. 1134 
 1135 
(1:54:12)  Well, when you said the politics in Vientiane got more interesting, what kinds of 1136 
things … 1137 
Well … 1138 
… you were observing? 1139 
… because at USAID, part of our job was trying to plan this post-war period, that was a whole new 1140 
world, dealing at the national level with national programs to be run through ministries, not handing 1141 
out pots and pans directly to people.  That's very different. 1142 
 1143 
(1:54:48)  Was there any sense of optimism that these ministries would not be so corrupt that 1144 
these programs could be run effectively and efficiently or was that … 1145 
The problem was the more you looked at them, the less confident one became about their abilities.  1146 
And see, we had not really ever been exposed, working up country, to what went on in Vientiane, to 1147 
what went on in the ministries.  And it was not a nice awakening to finally look at some of those 1148 
ministries.  There's nothing there. 1149 
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  1150 
(1:55:37)  Did you have a chance to read about or hear about the sort of political intrigue or 1151 
the sort of development of this tension that was going on between the representatives of the 1152 
old Royal Lao government and the Pathet Lao and the so-called neutralists and how this 1153 
was all taking shape? 1154 
We heard… [Chuckles]  We were part of the rumor mill in Vientiane.  Each—as I recall, each 1155 
ministry had a mixed—a mixed leadership.  And so since our contacts tended to be from the old 1156 
government side, we would get impressions of the other side through them, so it was filtered 1157 
through them.  But Lao politics is all family.  It's all who's connected to whom.  All of it.  Ideology is 1158 
really insignificant.  One very savvy political officer back in Unger's tenure did a massive family tree 1159 
of the five leading families of Laos and put it on his wall.  And you could figure out immediately the 1160 
policy implications of anything by looking at the family connections.  That's all that counted.  That's 1161 
all that mattered in Lao politics.  Who you're connected to, really.  And it's so easy to crack that 1162 
code.  You just needed genealogy.  You don't need any deep political analysis of interests and—1163 
abstract interests or so forth.  Just look at the family ties.  It's all there. 1164 
 1165 
(1:57:47)  Did you hear much of what was going on prior to the evacuation of Long Tieng?  1166 
For example, the assault on Sala Phou Khoun or any of the military developments that 1167 
preceded the evacuation of Long Tieng or was it more of a surprise to you when it unfolded? 1168 
I was in the States when it happened, but the—what month was that, by the way? 1169 
May. 1170 
Yeah.  I think I was still in the States.  The—let me see—yeah.  Yeah.  Because I was—Pop said, 1171 
‘Stay as long as you want.’  I was helping my mom get squared away after my father died.  I 1172 
remember when Muong Soui fell and a Thai artillery unit was overrun and captured.  That probably 1173 
preceded the Sala Phou Khoun thing.  But I have very vague memories of the Sala Phou Khoun 1174 
operation. 1175 
 1176 
(1:59:10)  So Long Tieng, too, you were in the States. 1177 
I'm pretty—yeah, I should know, but I'm pretty sure I was still in the States.  I'd have to dig up 1178 
some old travel records. 1179 
OK.  But you said that you were… 1180 
I certainly wasn't involved in it. 1181 
Yeah.  Yeah.  You said you were asked to come back as a Lao speaker to sort of help see … 1182 
Oh, I was already in Vientiane.  In other words, when this bloodless coup, ministry by ministry, took 1183 
place, Gordon Ramsey, the deputy director, the acting director, chose a bunch of people to stay 1184 
behind to first negotiate the release of the families, and then to continue talking to try to find out—1185 
to try to build a case that, first of all, to satisfy ourselves that, indeed, we had to leave and then to try 1186 
to convince Washington that we had to leave.  Because we knew that the embassy was going to 1187 
remain.  So how can USAID mission abandon all of its infrastructure and its assets and so forth?  1188 
There has to be a good reason.  No invasion.  No street fighting.  No blood in the streets.  No.  So 1189 
we had to make that case if indeed that case was going to be made and it turned out that that was it. 1190 
We found out from people in the ministry of public health that that negotiating track of the Pathet 1191 
Lao was to physically assemble all of the jeeps and the bottles of aspirin and the tin roofing sheets 1192 
and every single commodity, every radio, every tire that had ever been brought into the country and 1193 
compare the physical inventory with the paper inventory and then see how much we had “stolen”,  1194 
and then to put us on trial for having stolen the people's property.  And then to begin negotiations 1195 
on war reparations.  And so we found out, explicitly, what their negotiating strategy was, this was the 1196 
script that they were to follow.  That's when we were able to convince Washington that there was no 1197 
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future dealing with that government.  That they were not interested in development.  That it was 1198 
about a Marxist—filtered through Vietnamese, old octogenarian Vietnamese party bosses because 1199 
the Lao Dong party ran the LPP—Lao People's Party.  And we could abandon.  So we did.  We 1200 
were there for only about three weeks or so after the families got out, when we all left. 1201 
 1202 
(2:03:23)  Now Mac tells this story about going around in a truck with some Lao students 1203 
and lawyers and a Lao captain, going through houses, trying to determine what property 1204 
was personal property of Americans and what property was the property of the person who 1205 
owned the house and what property should be turned over to the people and this got to be a 1206 
rather demoralizing process, but by the same token he said that they were sitting around 1207 
one day drinking Cokes and … 1208 
Mac doesn't drink Coke.  Ever. 1209 
OK.  He was having a Singha.  They were having Cokes.  He said Cokes.  But I think some 1210 
of the students finally said, ‘So how much do you figure the United States is leaving behind?  1211 
How many millions of dollars?’  He said, ‘Well, we just had a meeting on this and it was 1212 
something like $160 million.’  I forget what the number was exactly.  Maybe $130 million, 1213 
$140 million.  They said, ‘Well, you must feel pretty bad about that.’  He said, ‘Well, I look at 1214 
it this way.  Do you know what the USAID budget for Laos was just for next year?’  ‘No.’  1215 
‘$65 million.’  ‘Oh, that sounds good.  $65 million.’  He said, ‘Well, how much of that do you 1216 
think you're going to get now?’  So to him it was about a short-term victory to them, but sort 1217 
of a long-term loss not just for the United States in terms of its position in Southeast Asia, 1218 
but in terms of the development and the aid that was provided to the Lao people.  Did you 1219 
see it at least somewhat in that way, or how did you view this departure from the region? 1220 
Well, I mean, we all had very strong emotional ties to Laos, the better part of, at that point, our lives, 1221 
our adult lives that we had spent there.  And so that was disappointing.  I mean, going off to some 1222 
god knows where are we going to go, what are we going to do at this point?  But when you look 1223 
back on it, I mean, the policy was a catastrophe.  I mean, the U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia was 1224 
stupid.  Eisenhower told Kennedy, in the limousine going to the inauguration, whatever you do, 1225 
don't get involved in a land war in Asia.  Whatever you do.  I leave you with one message.  Kennedy 1226 
ignored these warnings from the old general.  He sent the Marines to Udorn in response to General 1227 
Phoumi Nosavan's lies about a threat to Thailand.  And we haven't learned at all.  I mean, it's just—1228 
it was just idiotic.  And Laos got caught up in it all of the Vietnam mess, unfortunately.  I can't cite 1229 
sources for this, but I understand that many of the soldiers in the 314th and 316th NVA divisions 1230 
who were the bulk of the troops in Laos where, in fact, Hmong and other ethnolinguistic minority 1231 
groups that had brethren on the Lao side.  They weren't the dreaded lowland Vietnamese, the [Nya 1232 
La] or the … 1233 
The same in Thailand as well.  I mean, a lot of Hmong fought on the side of the 1234 
Communists in Thailand. 1235 
Yeah.  But, I mean, the whole—there is a soldier patch on which you can—which I have seen—big, 1236 
colored, it's lovely.  It says Participant, Southeast Asian War Games, 1965-1975, Second Place—1237 
which is great. 1238 
Yeah.  No small amount of … 1239 
Great.  Because you look at this part of the world now and you say, ‘What in the world were we 1240 
doing?’  What hubris.  It's just—and CBUs are still going off all over Laos, blowing people apart. 1241 
 1242 
(2:08:28)  Walking through Phonsavan and then seeing all these old shell casings in every 1243 
hotel and every restaurant and everywhere.  And those are the ones that are safe to have 1244 
around.  And knowing that you could see a lot more of the Plain of Jars except you might 1245 
 27 
blow up.  All of these things.  I mean, it is a painful reminder of what has yet to be done to 1246 
make that country whole and safe. 1247 
Oh, God.  Yeah.  It's terrible. 1248 
 1249 
(2:09:02)  So how long did you remain in Laos?  You said about three weeks after the—after 1250 
the USAID … 1251 
Roughly.  Maybe a month, but somewhere between two weeks and a month after the dependents 1252 
were all flown out.  Until we were able to determine that—what we—what sort of negotiations—I 1253 
mean, were the negotiations serious or what was going on?  And when we found out they were 1254 
leading to war reparations, first of all, they were leading toward a trial of missing assets. 1255 
[Desk attendant brings the two some water.  McKeithen thanks him in Thai.  Interviewer asks for a 1256 
receipt for his room]   1257 
Yeah, I'd say two weeks to a month.  Then Gordon assembled—Gordon Ramsey assembled most 1258 
of us in Washington, those of us that had to be reassigned, waiting for new assignments in 1259 
Washington to write up, from memory, as best we could, whatever documents we could lay our 1260 
hands on, the recent history of the programs that we'd been working on.  In my case, Maternal Child 1261 
Health Family Planning Program, which I started in the last couple years I was there, fresh from the 1262 
MPH from Chapel Hills.  OK.  That was a new program we got going with help from Meechai in 1263 
Thailand.  So he was good.  Gordon helped to document the experience in Laos. 1264 
 1265 
(2:10:51)  Was that at least a slightly cathartic experience, writing out this history of a 1266 
program that … 1267 
It was good discipline and good to get it on the record.  I don't know if—I'm sure it was compiled 1268 
in some sort of historic—some document, but who knows where it is. 1269 
 1270 
(2:11:13)  What—we didn't really talk specifically about that program.  What did you seek to 1271 
accomplish and how well did you think it went? 1272 
The Lao were beginning to experience the problems of unwanted children, excessive fertility as 1273 
defined by—the important question is you ask the woman, ‘Do you want to be pregnant now?’  I 1274 
mean, all of this talk about demographic impact and dependency ratios and the national burden and 1275 
the education and so forth and so on, that's sort of beside the point.  I mean, the basic question is, 1276 
‘Do you want to be pregnant now?’  And a lot of people said no to that.  It's very simple.  And so it's 1277 
a very simple idea is—I mean, if you can—if you can protect a woman from unwanted pregnancies, 1278 
that is the most cost effective public health intervention in the world.  There's no comparison in 1279 
terms of cost-effectiveness, about the health benefits.  So … 1280 
 1281 
I'm just warning you, I'm just a pessimist and I don't think that battery is going to run out, 1282 
but if it does midstream, I'm going to kill myself.  So that's [a second recorder] my backup.  1283 
Thank you. 1284 
Are you interested in lunch? 1285 
Yeah. We could take a break and have some lunch.  That would be fine.  Do we want to just 1286 
finish up this program and then we'll go from there? 1287 
OK.  The MCH program? 1288 
Yeah. 1289 
Yeah.  So basically there were several tracks to it.  One was working with the ministry of public 1290 
health on starting to make services available, contraceptive services and tied with Maternal Child 1291 
Health Services.  And the other was a policy thing.  We hired—Jiggs Weldon hired a guy who had 1292 
done work in this before to try to put together program, information programs to convince the 1293 
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national leadership that it made sense that a national demographic policy along the lines that 1294 
Thailand had adopted and other countries.  At that time, the island nations, Hong Kong and 1295 
Singapore and Taiwan, they—very good population, national demographic policies that talked about 1296 
limiting family size as a national goal so long that the rate of increased population growth and so 1297 
forth.  So it was a two-track approach:  services and policy.  And it was going along pretty nicely 1298 
because, I mean, when you're dealing with unmet demand, that is the easiest thing in the world to try 1299 
to address.  I mean, the demand was phenomenal, of course.  Thailand is a good example.  Thailand 1300 
in between 1965, if I'm not—I think it was 1965 to 1980, a 15-year period, the average number of 1301 
children born to a Thai mother, the total fertility rate, declined from six-and-a-half to two, just in 15 1302 
years of purely voluntary methods, all provided through normal government channels.  That's a 1303 
classic example of responding to a need.  If you get—if you can sort of—a very good example and 1304 
one that's been repeated worldwide since then.  But back in those days there were these great policy 1305 
debates about did something have to precede something else and da-da-da-da-da.  But programs like 1306 
the Thai program and working in the Thai mission, Thailand soon became a place where you would 1307 
bring people to see how it's done properly in a lot of fields—malaria, family planning and child 1308 
nutrition and so forth. 1309 
Let's have some lunch. 1310 
Yeah. 1311 
Where would you like to go?  I don't really know that much about … 1312 
 1313 
[New track begins] 1314 
 1315 
(0:09)  So we finished talking about the—I forget the actual name, but the women and 1316 
children's health program. 1317 
Oh, Maternal Child Health. 1318 
There you go.  OK.  So you had been writing a sort of … 1319 
We had—to put together a new project in USAID, it takes about two years from the time you start 1320 
preparing the documentation until you get money from Congress.  [Phone rings, McKeithen 1321 
answers it, talks briefly.]   So, yeah, it takes—the bureaucracy is deadly.  The documentation that 1322 
AID is required by Congress but then AID has imposed on itself over the years is—it's a miracle 1323 
that anything ever gets done.  It's really something else.  I mean, these international bureaucracies—1324 
AID, Asian Development Bank, my own experience so far has been with those two, but they are—1325 
they're really something else. 1326 
 1327 
(2:07)  Were there any times, maybe there were a number of times in which you had to do 1328 
things in the field when you were still at Sam Thong or Ban Xon that might have, at least in 1329 
spirit if not directly been in contravention of USAID policy or was this not really something 1330 
that you had to worry about too much in the field? 1331 
Gosh, I can't think of anything offhand.  I mean, we were [Pauses] I can't—nothing comes to mind.  1332 
The only thing that does to come mind is when my wife visited me.  The families had all been 1333 
evacuated from Vientiane in April or May of '75—April, I think.  And—but my wife snuck back 1334 
across to visit me when I was still with this negotiating group.  And somehow ran—later ran into 1335 
and mentioned her trip to John Gunther Dean who was, I think at that time, an ambassador or 1336 
DCO.  I think he was an ambassador to Thailand and he said, ‘I don't want to hear about it.’  That 1337 
was against the—that was—that's not an answer to your question.  That was her, not me doing 1338 
something against the rules.  But … 1339 
 1340 
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(3:59)  So most of the problems with USAID didn't affect what was happening sort of down 1341 
at the ground level.  It was more just … 1342 
No, I mean, the—working in the refugee program in the trenches, so to speak, was—we didn't get 1343 
involved in anything—any of that stuff.  Doing things against USAID regulations can involve, say, 1344 
instead of going through the proper procurement channels, you go downtown and buy a bottle of 1345 
aspirin or something.  But none of that ever—we never were put in that position.  Yeah. 1346 
 1347 
(4:44)  So you've left, you've written this essay that Gordon Ramsey has asked you to write 1348 
about the program that you administered.  He compiles all of this.  It's sitting somewhere.  1349 
Perhaps you'll find it someday.  And so, then you go where? 1350 
Haiti. 1351 
OK. 1352 
Then I got assigned to Haiti where Doctor Weldon had already—he had left in, I think, '73 to do—1353 
he and Pat both did an MPH at Harvard.  And then he was reassigned and he ended up in Haiti.  1354 
The Haitian mission had resumed the AID program after a 10-year hiatus.  Papa Doc had died, Baby 1355 
Doc come in, new government, new program and that was a good time bureaucratically to be there.  1356 
You didn't have to inherit other people's problems.  You could create your own.  And so I was his 1357 
program officer and then the deputy in the public health office down there.  And then he did finally 1358 
retire from AID at the post in Haiti.  Pat went onto USAID Cairo, Jiggs came out to—then he 1359 
moved to the Philippines, retired in the Philippines.  And I was in Haiti for four years.  And then in 1360 
Washington for three or four—three.  No, wait a minute.  No, no, after Haiti, back to Bangkok, I'm 1361 
sorry.  Haiti, Bangkok for two years in the refugee program and then one year in the public health 1362 
office.  So three years—'79 to '81 in Bangkok. 1363 
 1364 
(6:34)  Well, let's talk about the years in Bangkok and the work with the refugee program 1365 
there. 1366 
We visited—yeah, the refugee program—our job was to, basically, to certify the bona fides of the 1367 
refugees as indeed refugees from Laos—in the case of the Lao camps, refugees from Laos. 1368 
This is still under the auspices of USAID. 1369 
No.  We were seconded from AID to the State Department to their Office of Refugee Affairs.  And 1370 
we were ethnic affairs officers, we were called.  And our job was to prepare families for interviews 1371 
with INS who would make the determination that they did have a well-founded fear of persecution 1372 
and therefore qualified under the current refugee acts and quotas at that time.  And so we wanted to 1373 
screen out the non-refugees and Lao speakers from Isan [NE Thailand] who were claiming to be 1374 
refugees from Laos.  We had people from Taiwan who claimed to be refugees from Laos.  And … 1375 
 1376 
(7:56)  How did they get there? 1377 
Through Vientiane.  That's an amazing family.  So we learned a lot about the current regime in Laos 1378 
as part of our screening process. For example, we would show samples of Lao currency to people 1379 
whom we thought might not be real refugees without showing the denomination—without showing 1380 
the number. ‘Identify that bill.’  And we would ask people to complete certain slogans that were part 1381 
of the liturgy of the Lao government.  Every government document has a certain slogan that 1382 
appears across the top of it.  And we would ask people to name movie theaters in Vientiane.  And 1383 
we would ask—and we would use these terms that only people who had been in Laos since '75 and 1384 
had been exposed to the terminology of the revolution would understand.  For example,  “What's a 1385 
boun meeting” and other examples of the lexicon of ‘new speak’ that had come into force.  And so 1386 
we devised all these different screening mechanisms. Jerry Daniels’ role was to validate the claims of 1387 
military service, because that was a separate category for refugee admissions.  ‘…In which unit, 1388 
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where were you stationed?’. He had photographs of people and places and so forth.  ‘Name this 1389 
person,’ etc. Part of our job also was the care and feeding of the refugees and keeping track of how 1390 
refugees were treated by the Thai authorities, both at the border and in the camps, in order to get an 1391 
accurate picture of what was going on that the embassy could then intercede with the Ministry of 1392 
Interior for better treatment.  And so that was very interesting because it allowed us to keep up, 1393 
keep abreast with what was happening in Laos.  And the interviews of the refugees then painted a 1394 
picture of life in Laos, which was part of the rationale for the basis of the program: that this was a 1395 
nasty, brutish place where people were treated badly. We also tried to find out about the “seminars,” 1396 
what was going on there and so forth.  So a lot of the interviews with refugees contributed to 1397 
reporting cables on life in the LPDR. We saw that the Vietnamese were trying to impose their 1398 
interpretation of Marxism and Leninism through their Lao counterparts.  And it just didn't fit.  I 1399 
mean, like so much of the ideology, it didn't work with the Lao culture at all.  The whole guilt trip.  I 1400 
mean, self confession and self criticism sessions.  You stand up in front of your peers and describe 1401 
your sins and why you should be flogged and drawn and quartered. The Vietnamese were trying to 1402 
introduce the concept of guilt to a society that knows shame, but not guilt.  I'm sorry.  And that—1403 
and the Vietnamese maybe.  I don't know enough about Vietnamese.  I had the impression that they 1404 
actually have a concept of guilt.  These people don't.  And it just doesn't work at that fundamental 1405 
level.  And of course, it originated with Europeans who understand guilt very well.  Out here it 1406 
doesn't fly.  And the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao tried to impose this whole collectivization concept 1407 
and this very onerous top-down system of quotas and taxes on your production. In the old days in 1408 
Laos, government really was very ineffective, which was a great benefit from the standpoint of the 1409 
village.  The village, if it existed, would almost by definition be prospering. People survived.  And 1410 
government stayed out of the way.  But the Pathet Lao, using the Vietnamese model, didn't operate 1411 
that way.  They wanted to be involved in everything and so you got this heavy hand of government 1412 
getting involved in their lives.  Not very pleasant.  People spying on each other and so forth.  And 1413 
then, of course, then the graphic accounts emerged of people getting shot trying to get across the 1414 
river and punished when they get caught and so forth and so on.  And to this day, the Vietnamese 1415 
are running a policy of genocide against the Hmong in Laos.  It's a grudge.  I think—I can't explain 1416 
it any other way than it's just a grudge against the Hmong and VP in particular, but all these 1417 
innocent people are getting caught up. 1418 
Well, I think, too, from what little I know, also sort of a grudge against these so-called Chao 1419 
Fa who lasted for so long after the Americans left and continued to live off the ideology that 1420 
remained after VP left. 1421 
Yeah.  But it's really criminal.  And that's something that Vieng Say and the people at RFA could 1422 
help you out on.  They really keep up with that sort of thing.  [Food comes]  Go ahead.  While it's 1423 
hot. 1424 
 1425 
(15:30)  I guess so.  I see now.  This looks like syrup.  So we mentioned Jerry Daniels before 1426 
and that you got to know him pretty well during this period.  How would you describe him? 1427 
Jerry was [speaking in Thai to waiter]—Jerry was—he, [Pauses as he listens to waiter speak to 1428 
manager] I don't know.  (I'm just—I'm trying to get the fan turned off for the sound, the noise.)  1429 
Very knowledgeable about the history of the Hmong insurgency because he—to the best of my 1430 
knowledge, he didn't have a specific area of responsibility, geographically, with Vang Pao.  He was 1431 
sort of all over the place.  And he'd been there a long time, so he knew the leadership.  He knew the 1432 
history. 1433 
 1434 
(17:04)  He spent a decent amount of time in Na Khang, didn't he? 1435 
Na Khang, yeah.  He was in the Sam Neua operation. 1436 
 31 
Well, with all the traveling he did, did he learn to fly or was he…? 1437 
No, but Frank Odom did.  Frank Odom is another case officer who got interested in flying and 1438 
ended up as a CIA pilot, actually, and got shot down and killed in the Congo, I think it was.  He got 1439 
blown apart on final approach by some friendlies.  But Frank—no, Jerry didn't fly, but Frank did 1440 
and actually made a new career out of it. 1441 
Anyway, I was interrupting your train of thought.  You were talking about Jerry. 1442 
I—yeah, Jerry's just a great guy, even-tempered and held very few prejudices.  I mean, sharp, savvy 1443 
guy.  He understood, to a certain extent, the folly of the whole exercise, but wanted to help the real 1444 
bona fide refugees and try to protect the program from the fakes.  And [Pauses] yeah—he—his 1445 
death was really stupid, really a tragedy.  [Food arrives] Wow.  [Speaking in Thai] Anyway, I won't 1446 
get into his death because it's irrelevant. 1447 
But it was asphyxiation from a faulty heater, right? 1448 
Yeah.  A pilot light went out.  The room was sealed so the gas continued to flow out through the 1449 
pilot light and it was asphyxiation.  It was an airtight, air conditioned room.  [More food arrives] 1450 
Wow.  My God. 1451 
Holy moley.  [Laughs] 1452 
We can share the salad.  I'll put it right here.  So feel free to dig into that. 1453 
 1454 
(19:58)  All right.  Well, I'll clean my plate over here first.  Now VP went to Montana, I 1455 
assume, largely because of his friendship with Jerry. 1456 
I believe so.  I believe so.  First, I think, as part of the recuperation.  He got shot in the arm and I 1457 
think he ended up buying some property there or acquiring some property there somehow.  That's a 1458 
rumor.  I don't know that for a fact. 1459 
I think that's right, though.  I think he lived there for maybe two, three years and tried 1460 
farming and raising cattle and all that.  And I've got to go back and study that story again, 1461 
but I don't think he was particularly welcomed in the community and things didn't pan out 1462 
and maybe the farming didn't go as well as he had hoped and so he ended up in the 1463 
Sacramento area. 1464 
OK. 1465 
 1466 
(20:53)  So I would imagine you heard more than your share of harrowing stories about what 1467 
is happening to people across the border. 1468 
Yeah.  [Pauses]  But what we really couldn't find out much about was the seminar, what was going 1469 
on in the seminars because not that many people were released, particularly in the early days.  And it 1470 
was very hard to get a picture of what—how bad it was. 1471 
Now technically speaking, is seminar distinct from a reeducation camp? 1472 
I don't think there's any distinction.  I think the seminars were broken down by type of inmate.  1473 
They had the one—they had an island for Done Xao and Done Ying or Done Xai and Done Ying 1474 
and some island or islands in the Nam Ngum Reservoir were low-security seminars.  And then 1475 
officers—I don't know what—if there was a cutoff of rank or not where—at a different seminar. 1476 
And probably local politicians as opposed to military and… 1477 
I have the impression that they were segregated by rank and position and perceived, perhaps, 1478 
perceived threat. 1479 
 1480 
(22:44)  So what was the relationship like between the case officers who were taking these 1481 
stories down and getting refugees ready for application, first of all, I suppose, just to be 1482 
classified as a refugee and secondly for possible relocation elsewhere and the INS officers? 1483 
 32 
It could—it was—it could be testy.  In other words, every time INS rejected a family, we would leap 1484 
to their defense.  And we naturally thought that a lot of the INS decisions were arbitrary  1485 
—but they could be appealed. The head of INS was Jack Fortner - - a very capable guy.  Very smart.  1486 
He had some cowboys under him.  And so we were often able to take a case to Jack and get it 1487 
reversed or get another hearing.  And so the onus was on us and JVA.  We had this group called the 1488 
Joint Voluntary Agency… 1489 
In Thailand, the International Rescue Commission. 1490 
Yes.  Who hired people to do the real scutwork, the detailed interviewing and development of the 1491 
families and they had a—they had a hard time.  We all had a hard time because the INS definitions 1492 
of brother and sister are narrow.  The Lao definitions of brother and sister are quite broad.  And you 1493 
get into cousin and that's another world.  So family structure was always a big issue and who's real 1494 
family and who's not real family and so forth.  And there was a natural tension in the relationship 1495 
between INS and the Ethnic Affairs Officers. 1496 
 1497 
(25:07)  For the average American who's never spent time in a refugee camp and even for 1498 
young Hmong who may not really understand what their parents and grandparents had to 1499 
go through, what is life in—and I realize there are differences from camp to camp, but what 1500 
would life be like for a person who crossed the border and found themselves in Ban Vinai or 1501 
Chiang Khong or … 1502 
Well, first they'd be put in a Thai jail and they might be sent back to Laos.  They’d probably have all 1503 
their money taken and be stuck in this jail for awhile.  If they made it to the camp, they would be 1504 
protected. The Volags [voluntary agencies], who had the contracts to provide relief to the camps, did 1505 
a pretty good job.  So people had medical care, they had food. From the refugee standpoint, the 1506 
most frustrating aspect was not knowing what was going to happen.  Were they going to be turned 1507 
down by the U.S.?  Should they apply to France?  Should they start out by applying to Australia?  1508 
Who really made the decision?  Could they pay somebody off?  I mean, the social norms—the 1509 
mechanisms that they were used to dealing with just didn't apply. 1510 
 1511 
(27:24)  Were there—here again, I suppose there was a pretty wide variety of possibilities, 1512 
but was there really much opportunity for any kind of meaningful work— 1513 
No.  1514 
—or was it mostly just kind of sitting around waiting for your number to come up or waiting 1515 
to make a decision? 1516 
A lot of sitting around.  Now maintenance of the camp and your own structure and whatever 1517 
community projects people could organize were important, of course.  But I mean, nobody had any 1518 
real commitment to those because they were not going to be there, they hoped.  So… 1519 
 1520 
(28:09)  Now did you work with Jim Anderson at all from the IRC? 1521 
Jim Anderson.  Probably. 1522 
He's in St. Paul, so … 1523 
Was he a Cambodian language speaker, do you know? 1524 
I don't think so, but, well, I think he—then again, we worked with Cambodians, so maybe 1525 
he was. 1526 
OK. 1527 
He married one of Fred Walker's daughters. 1528 
Oh, yeah.  The doctor or … 1529 
No, the Air America chief pilot. 1530 
Oh, no.  But I mean, one of Fred's daughter is a … 1531 
 33 
Oh, no.  It's her older sister.  Patricia is the doctor.  Elizabeth is the girl he married. 1532 
Did she work for this French VOLAG? 1533 
Oh, yeah.  I think she did.  And then she came to work for JVA.  In fact, she worked for Jim.  1534 
That's how they met. 1535 
OK. 1536 
And then there's another sister still—Susan, maybe? 1537 
Susan Walker is the one I'm thinking of who … 1538 
OK. 1539 
She's the one who worked for [Speaks with waiter].  Yeah, she worked with the French VOLAG. 1540 
I'm trying to get all three sisters to sit down and chat with me, but it's a bit of undertaking 1541 
given how busy they all are, especially Pat.  I would imagine this had to have been a rather 1542 
delicate situation for the Thai government to have refugees from three or four countries 1543 
streaming across their borders, their own citizens quite upset that here are these people 1544 
taking up land and maybe resources, at least from their perspective, even though most of 1545 
them are coming from the outside.  And then having to deal with the governments from 1546 
which these people are from. 1547 
Yeah.  Land wasn't so much of a problem, but the perception of the communities near the refugee 1548 
camps could become jaded, that the refugees were simply a bunch of people hanging around getting 1549 
fed, sometimes with better medical attention than the people outside the fence got.  Then of course, 1550 
the perception on the part of the Volags was sometimes that the people on the outside of the fence 1551 
were exploiting people on the inside by charging them abnormally high prices for staple 1552 
commodities and so forth and so on.  And it was a situation sort of designed for exploitation of one 1553 
sort or another. 1554 
 1555 
(31:11)  Thai guards perhaps assaulting women in the camps.  Things of that nature. 1556 
That was—I don't—I can't think of an episode of that.  I mean, I … 1557 
That may have been more rumor in the camps than a reality? 1558 
There were some examples of Pathet Lao trying—a Pathet Lao tried to kill the abbot of the Nong 1559 
Khai camp.  I don't know if he was called the abbot of the Nong Khai camp, but he was certainly 1560 
the senior monk.  He ended up running the Wat in Virginia outside of Washington and west of 1561 
Washington.  He's a very—he still has a hatchet mark on his forehead. 1562 
 1563 
(32:06)  My goodness.  So did you see any evidence or hear any rumors of Hmong refugees 1564 
slipping back over the border trying to participate in the ongoing rebellion against this new 1565 
government or was that … 1566 
Oh, I think so.  I think that—I think that happened, indeed.  I think that whatever resistance groups 1567 
were operating on Thai soil had ties with the Hmong at Ban Vinai.  They probably asked for 1568 
donations, I'm speculating, but I'm sure that there was some communication.  That was always the 1569 
very vocal claim on the Lao government's part that Ban Vinai was nothing but a staging area for the 1570 
Hmong resistance.  But it really wasn't.  I mean, it wasn't overt. 1571 
 1572 
(33:18)  It was (***), as it were.  Did you see many cases in which Hmong families, say, 1573 
applied to go to the United States or elsewhere, asked everything and had their shots, had 1574 
the orientation and then just couldn't bring themselves to leave?  Maybe they thought the 1575 
situation in Laos would change to make it go back or they were waiting for family to come 1576 
over or whatever the case might be? 1577 
I can't think of anything.  Not to say that it didn't happen, but nothing comes to mind. 1578 
 1579 
 34 
(34:09)  So you worked out of Vientiane and visited numerous camps or were you designated 1580 
to certain … 1581 
Bangkok. 1582 
Yeah, at Bangkok.  Yes.  [Chuckles] 1583 
And—mainly Nong Khai—the big Lao camp in Nong Khai, Ban Vinai, the Hmong camp, and later 1584 
Nakhon Phanom.  There was a camp there—Hmong camp in Nakhon Phanom.  And occasionally 1585 
Phanat Nikhom, which was a processing center.  And a couple gigs in the Khmer camps just 1586 
because they were short of people.  But—and then, one trip to Chiang Kham.  There was a Mien, 1587 
predominantly Mien camp, Mien camp at Chiang Kham.  And Ubon.  There used to be a fairly large 1588 
Lao camp at Ubon.  Yeah.  Quite large, in fact.  And after most of them got processed then the 1589 
residual Lao went to Nong Khai and eventually everybody ended up near NKP.  But the Ubon 1590 
camp did indeed have fairly close ties with the Lao resistance in southern Laos.  That was—I 1591 
remember interviewing guys from the—in the resistance in the Ubon refugee camp. 1592 
 1593 
(35:53)  Do you remember any particular details they shared about what they were up to? 1594 
No.  I was trying to find out what life was like on the other side, obviously, and the taxation and 1595 
the—how much of their rice harvest had to be handed over and how it was enforced and so forth 1596 
and so on.  And in that same camp, [name removed] was given yellow rain. . . The fact that he 1597 
handed it over to the CIA and they threw it away and never did anything with it.  It got lost and 1598 
unbelievable. 1599 
He said that the fellow that he went with to get it decided not buy it,   1600 
Yeah 1601 
that they saw it, but that they didn't actually get it. 1602 
Yeah.  Yeah.  I mean, they threw away the chance to—you got the proof. 1603 
So it wasn't bee shit, as it were. 1604 
I mean—which reminds me of another case officer, Bremer is his name up at Pha Khao, Site 14, 1605 
who got ahold of a senior captain, North Vietnamese captain, who was a walking encyclopedia on 1606 
EOB—enemy order of battle statistics, the structure and force levels of all of those units up there.  1607 
And a gold mine.  Bremer had made his career, his next promotion—because he was not contract.  1608 
He was from Langley.  He was a career intelligence officer.  And after a month of all day, all night 1609 
sessions with this guy, they finally decided to box him, and—the guy was lying through his teeth.  I 1610 
mean, everything he said was a complete fabrication and Bremer almost killed himself.  He almost 1611 
killed the guy.  And it was fascinating to watch, to watch him just crumble.  The guy literally fell 1612 
apart and slinked away and left MR-2 never to return.  He left Site 14 and we heard that he left 1613 
Vientiane.  That he was—that he had a breakdown, a mental breakdown. 1614 
 1615 
(38:57)  That story sounds remotely familiar.  I can't remember—I can't remember.  Did … 1616 
Well, one guy—his boss, Jack Shirley, was at Site 14 at the time and I met Bremer several times 1617 
because I was talking to the same guy because I was interested in the North Vietnamese occupation, 1618 
the civil administration of Xieng Khouang Province.  Why the North Vietnamese were so 1619 
involved—what were they doing.  We gradually developed the thesis that they needed the land 1620 
because Nghe An Province is dirt poor next door.  And the Plain of Jars is called the Tranninh.  1621 
Tranninh Plateau in Vietnamese.  It’s had a Vietnamese name for a long time.  And right after the 1622 
Second World War, according to [Xieng Khouang provincial governor] Chao Saykham, some 10,000 1623 
Vietnamese from Nghe An province settled on the Plain of Jars, just came in and squatted and 1624 
started growing stuff.  And he was able to organize enough army trucks to expel them and get them 1625 
out.  So here’s this irredentist claim against the Tranninh Plateau, known in Lao as Thong Hai Hin – 1626 
the Plain of Jars.  And at the provincial level of the Xieng Khouang Pathet Lao administration the 1627 
 35 
Vietnamese have advisors in agriculture, education, public health and, you name it, civil works, etc. 1628 
which is a normal advisory structure at each line office in the bureaucracy.  But then they also had 1629 
the “959” group.  What the hell was the 959 group?  The 959 group had the same kind of 1630 
bureaucratic line ministry organization, but not as advisors to the Pathet Lao government in Xieng 1631 
Khouang Province.  It was independent.  It turned out the 959 group was the shadow government, 1632 
the advance government of the Vietnamese community that would move and live in Tran Yin. 1633 
So this was part of … 1634 
Occupation.  This was the part of the plan.  That's right. 1635 
 1636 
(41:34)  Do you know roughly when this was that these 10,000—maybe you said and I just 1637 
didn't … 1638 
Right at the end of the Second World War. 1639 
OK. 1640 
This is right—this is in '45 when the French pulled out, the Brits pulled out.  There was this power 1641 
vacuum.  The Japanese were gone. 1642 
So probably right about the time that Ho Chi Minh was pronouncing his Republic of 1643 
Vietnam or maybe shortly before. 1644 
I don't know the timing.  But, yeah.  But this Tranninh business—these are interviews that I did in 1645 
the late ‘60s.  That's what they were doing.  They were preparing for—and Saykham talked a lot 1646 
about, well, if you'd ask him, he'd talk a lot about the problem of keeping the Vietnamese out of 1647 
Laos.  In fact, when we were—during the PGNU era, '73 to '75, there was a hot rumor in Vientiane 1648 
that Souphanouvong had successfully resisted Vietnamese attempts to bring in 100,000 Vietnamese 1649 
settlers to live in Laos.  Because apparently Nghe An is really dirt poor.  And so there is this 1650 
irredentist lebensraum aspect to the Vietnamese role and national interest in Laos. 1651 
 1652 
(43:16)  When we look back at the number of times that Burma and Vietnam and, I think 1653 
China as well, invaded Laos over the centuries before all of this, it's not surprising in a way.  1654 
I mean, it's sort of a consistent theme that Laos is the poor cousin stuck in the middle and 1655 
landlocked between all of these more dominant powers. 1656 
But back then they did it for really important reasons, like great elephant shit war where the—Chao 1657 
Saykham told me this story where the Mandarin of Hue was used to collecting tribute from the 1658 
principalities in the area, including the principality of Luang Prabang.  And ‘what can you send me 1659 
this year?’  ‘I can send you a white elephant from Luang Prabang to express my deep respect’ for the 1660 
Mardarin at Hue.  He said, ‘How am I going to take care of a white elephant?  It’s—but to show 1661 
you're—that you mean business, cut off his foot.  Send me his foot and I will accept that.  It's a lot 1662 
easier to deal with.’ 1663 
[Laughs] Unless you're the elephant. 1664 
Unless you're the elephant.  So the prince of Luang Prabang cut off the white elephant's foot, put it 1665 
in an ornate silver box, shipped it through the good offices of Xieng Khouang, Chao Saykham's 1666 
father and grandfather, en route to Hue.  Well, Saykham's father or grandfather didn't like either one 1667 
of these guys very much, took out the elephant's foot and replaced it with elephant shit, which 1668 
arrived at Hue—and so the Vietnamese invaded, they dispatched an army to rape and pillage Luang 1669 
Prabang and went through Xieng Khouang en route and raised havoc in Xieng Khouang.  This was 1670 
when wars were fought over important foreign policy. 1671 
Like insulting, yeah, foreign potentates. 1672 
Yeah.  So you're right.  I mean, this part of the world, the Emerald Buddha here was hidden in a 1673 
stupa here in town for 43 years because, if you have the Emerald Buddha, it's like the king in a game 1674 
of chess.  You win.  The war is over.  And they hid it from a potential Burmese invasion.  And it was 1675 
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so well hidden it was lost until that stupa downtown here got hit by lightening.  And when they 1676 
repaired it, they found it inside.  I mean, yeah, this part of the world has been torn apart by war for a 1677 
long time. 1678 
 1679 
(46:25)  So as you were gathering these stories, what accounts did you hear about yellow rain 1680 
and what opinion have you developed over the years regarding what it was or was not? 1681 
The U.S. army sent out their chemical warfare experts from, I think, Fort Detrick, Texas, I think, or 1682 
Maryland.  Anyway, four or five of these guys came out here and I was assigned to take them to Ban 1683 
Vinai to interview Hmong who had been exposed to yellow rain.  And I spent about a week with 1684 
these guys.  And they came out here totally [speaks in Thai to waiter], very skeptical. But they went 1685 
away true believers.  And these were guys who, independently—I sat in on these interviews where 1686 
they took people apart, different guys interviewed them.  They all came up with—and they were 1687 
asking for—they were doing medical histories and gathering symptoms.  And they said there were 1688 
two chemical agents involved.  One was a blistering agent and one was a nerve agent.  And they 1689 
came away absolutely convinced that the victims were telling the truth.  No question.  And then 1690 
there's Bill Garrett's story in the Geographic, slightly less scientific.  (Have some salad—if you want it.) 1691 
Oh, I'm pretty well stuffed. 1692 
Well, and then this episode with [name removed].  It sounds like—it sounds like it was for real.  It 1693 
sounds like maybe some Russians wanted to experiment with a delivery system—and this was a 1694 
convenient theater to do the experiments in.  But those two things—the [name removed] story and 1695 
my experience with the U.S. Army bacteriological warfare experts.  And that's me, anyway. 1696 
 1697 
(48:59)  I forget the fellow's name.  I should remember.  He runs a program called 1698 
MINORS.  He's a photographer.  Too many names in the last three weeks.  But he said he 1699 
was on a hillside when—the Lao plane went over an area where he was pretty sure there 1700 
were Hmong people and he saw a little burst of yellow. 1701 
No kidding. 1702 
And he was convinced at first that it was his imagination and so he didn't say anything even 1703 
though he was standing there next to someone else.  But apparently not that many weeks 1704 
later his friend brought it up and so they realized, no, they really both had seen the same 1705 
thing. 1706 
This was a Hmong fighter? 1707 
No, this was an American photographer who was just out shooting photos and they saw 1708 
this. 1709 
He was up near Phu Bia someplace? 1710 
Yeah, I forget exactly where he said he was.  This was literally just a casual conversation we 1711 
were having. 1712 
God Almighty.  Christ, they still have this stuff? 1713 
Oh, no.  This was years ago that he was there.  No, I'm sorry, this wasn't recently. 1714 
OK.  Wow.  So I think there was no question about it.  There was something there.  It's like the 1715 
MIA thing.  The odds are that some of these guys survived.  Jiggs used to say 600 guys had—are 1716 
missing in Laos out of roughly 2,500.  About 600 in Laos.  A certain percentage had to survive their 1717 
parachute.  A certain percentage had to have survived whatever reception they got, particularly if 1718 
they fell into regular NVA units, they're going to be taken care of.  How come zero have—but the 1719 
politics of it in the U.S.  The head of the League of Families, a woman, was sleeping with Richard 1720 
Childress who was the U.S. State Department—was he State or Pentagon, head of MIA.  So talk 1721 
about lobbying.  [Interviewer laughs]  And Charlie Salmon, who was DCM in Vientiane several years 1722 
back, a couple decades back, tells a story of one—a farang-looking guy came out of—a photograph 1723 
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appeared.  A photograph shows up.  A guy looks like he's Western.  ‘Anybody know this guy?’  And 1724 
so this photograph circulated among the MIA families of the U.S.  ‘There's Dad.’  So they come out 1725 
to Vientiane.  The embassy finally locates this guy.  He's up near Ban Ban someplace.  They get him 1726 
down to Vientiane.  ‘That's Dad.’  Dad could speak no English, but he's been brainwashed.  They've 1727 
brainwashed him so that he's totally lost his ability to speak English.  They do DNA tests.  It's not 1728 
Dad.  This is the product of some union.  He's a half French, half something guy living—that's been 1729 
living as a farmer from Ban Ban.  This family could not believe otherwise.  ‘I'm sorry.  That's him.  1730 
He's just been—they've messed with his head.’ 1731 
Genetically altered. 1732 
People just won't face reality.  Astounding. 1733 
 1734 
(53:02)  So what finally took you out of your position of helping refugees? 1735 
Well, let's see.  Oh, I got a chance to—that was a two-year—there was a word for it.  PASA—1736 
participating agency service agreement, under which we're seconded from AID to the State 1737 
Department.  So I got a chance to get back into my field, which is public health, as the deputy of the 1738 
public health office in USAID Thailand.  That lasted one year.  I was supposed to come back, but 1739 
the new director needed an extra slot to bring out his girlfriend to be his executive assistant.  So that 1740 
didn't work.  So back to Washington.  And then later I finagled an assignment back out and I ran 1741 
that office, public health office for five years.  And also several other the projects.  We had—this is 1742 
irrelevant to your subject,  1743 
That’s all right. 1744 
but it's interesting that we had—well, first something that is relevant.  Thailand beat malaria.  They 1745 
did a very nice job and Thailand did a very nice job in their family planning efforts and so forth.  1746 
And all of these programs would be so easily replicated by the Lao.  In fact, by Lao-speaking Isan 1747 
former health workers.  But—and in fact, the Thai government is trying to do that—they have a 1748 
foreign aid program of their own and they're trying to do that, but I don't know how successful it is.  1749 
Anyway, one of the interesting things about the Thai program was the science and technology grant 1750 
program that we had to set up for the bilateral mission because the worldwide grants were all being 1751 
won by Thai scientists and they were beating out scientists from virtually every other country in the 1752 
world.  So we set up a parallel but bilateral program just for Thailand.  These are grants in material 1753 
sciences, applied electronics and biotech.  They have to be commercially—have commercial 1754 
implications.  At the higher echelon of education, Thailand is in very good shape.  The problem is, at 1755 
the high school level, only about 50% of high school aged kids finish high school in Thailand.  1756 
There aren't enough slots.  There aren't enough schools.  It's a scandal.  It's really terrible.  So 1757 
after—so my involvement in Laos really ended pretty much until '97 and I went to a part of Laos I'd 1758 
never worked in, which was northeast of Ban Huai Sai, up in Nam Tha on the China border, 1759 
doing—looking at the social impact of this road project.  And this was part of the Asian 1760 
Development Bank's loan requirements.  They have to have an environmental impact statement and 1761 
so forth.  And so I got a chance to work with Jim Chamberlain and look at—and the people up 1762 
there.  And that is a really fascinating part of the world.  Very, very large number of different 1763 
languages spoken up there and it's really interesting.  And you get up into China at Yunnan and you 1764 
can—I can speak Lao and can get along quite well, in southern Yunnan.  What they call Sip Song 1765 
Pan Na, which is the old—they call it Xi Xuong Pan Na or something like that.  But it's Sip Song 1766 
Pan Na.  And the name of the Mekong River in China is Lane Xang. 1767 
Interesting. 1768 
Lane Xang. 1769 
 1770 
(57:27)  So what was it like to be back in Laos again, sort of … 1771 
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It was a very different experience because we were dealing—our counterparts were all Lao 1772 
government officials and they're trying to do a job.  Bureaucrats like every place else.  But—and I 1773 
met some Hmong.  One of the senior officials in the Nam Tha transportation department was a 1774 
Hmong engineer.  And we talked a little bit about Sam Thong, Long Tieng in the old days.  He 1775 
wasn't involved, so—he'd been—he was Hmong from way up there.  But they wrestled with—the 1776 
bureaucrats wrestle with the imposition of the party.  The party is a pain.  The mandatory education 1777 
sessions that you have to go to, to listen to policy is a pain.  And at every structure of government, 1778 
you see, you have the regular bureaucratic structure and then you have the party.  And so they have 1779 
to clear on everything.  And they're hacks.  They may not really understand what's going on with 1780 
road design or anything else.  So it's a pain.  And that part of Laos is being sold out to China and the 1781 
Chinese built the TV station in Udom Sai.  They now call it Udom Sai.  It's the big town north of 1782 
Pak Beng.  And part of the deal is the 10-year exclusive right to do the programming.  So they're 1783 
going to Sinocize that—and they're—as late as, I mean, as recently as 2002, I went back again to 1784 
Luang Nam Tha and a number of Chinese speakers who spoke no Lao, and the market was 1785 
enormous.  These people are just flooding in and getting papers.  Plus investment by a lot of 1786 
Chinese in rubber plantations, which contributed the last couple of years to a tremendous amount of 1787 
smoke all over this part of the world, big clearing operations to grow rubber up there.  So it's China.  1788 
China agreed to fund half of the cost of the bridge between Chiang Khong and Ban Huai Sai.  This 1789 
a bridge between Laos and Thailand.  But because they view that road as such a high priority road, 1790 
they're paying half the cost of the bridge, which is going to be around $30 million, $40 million.  And 1791 
it's so important because it will put a container at the Port of Bangkok in two day from Kunming 1792 
instead of one week to Shenzhen or Zhuhai.  It's faster.  They can be at the border in a day and they 1793 
can be in Bangkok in another day with a container.  So fortunately, it's not going to come right 1794 
through here.  It will—it goes—the route goes slightly east of here.  But people around here, the 1795 
new Mae Fah Luang University north of town here has a Chinese language center—beautiful place.  1796 
They have native teachers.  A bunch of kids from Beijing teaching Chinese.  People in town here are 1797 
learning Chinese, getting ready for the flood, the SUVs, the heavy smokers coming down.  It's—this 1798 
is the Chinese century, the 21st century. 1799 
 1800 
(1:01:57)  Oh, no doubt about it.  No doubt about it.  It's—I've heard people say this.  Do 1801 
you think it's fair to characterize sort of the end of the war period as Vietnam trying to 1802 
clamp onto Laos and China trying to clamp onto Thailand? 1803 
No, I think that—no, I don't—I don't buy the latter part of that because the Thai negotiated with 1804 
the Chinese and end the Chinese support for the Communist part of Thailand and peripherally, end 1805 
to support for the Communist party of Burma, and on the basis of commercial interests.  So the 1806 
Thai and the Chinese came to an understanding that stuck.  But the Vietnamese indeed want to 1807 
hand onto Laos for whatever reason.  Part of it is irredentist, I believe.  Part of it may be paranoia.  1808 
Part of it may be the knowledge that the way the Vietnamese populated South Vietnam was through 1809 
Laos, through Thakhek and straight down the river.  But for whatever reason they want to maintain 1810 
their influence in Laos. 1811 
 1812 
(1:03:28)  Were there—do you think there were hopes by Vietnam that they might have more 1813 
influence in Bangkok or in Thailand that they ended up having? 1814 
In Thailand? 1815 
Yeah. 1816 
I wonder—I don't know how much influence in Thailand.  They're probably smart enough to realize 1817 
that the Thais would never—I mean, what does Vietnam have to offer Thailand?  China, yeah, but, I 1818 
don't know.  The Vietnamese influence in Thailand [Pauses] Now there is—there are a lot of 1819 
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Vietnamese around Sakon Nakhon.  There are a lot of Vietnamese from Dien Bien Phu across from 1820 
Vientiane.  But politically, I mean, in the absence of the Communist movement, which is pretty 1821 
dead, I don't think… [Pauses]  Vietnam is interested in getting investment from everywhere, 1822 
including Thailand.  That's really—that's what people want now.  But politically, the real question is 1823 
when or how will the Vietnamese ever loosen their hold over the Lao government?  That's the real 1824 
question.  What do you hear from the Hmong about their—the Hmong diaspora about their 1825 
relations with the Hmong in China, in Kuang Shu? 1826 
Well, I think it's starting to develop as a generation of Hmong scholars begin to emerge.  If 1827 
you look at—I think there's more than 180 Hmong PhDs in the United States now.  A lot of 1828 
them are interested in studying their own history, their own culture, developing sort of an 1829 
anthropological paradigm for the Hmong people, all these kinds of things.  So a lot of them 1830 
are looking to China.  And a lot of them are sort of searching for their roots in China.  After 1831 
all, the Hmong were relative newcomers to Southeast Asia.  So I think most of them sort of 1832 
look to China more as their home, particularly, I think, in the wake of some of the scandals 1833 
and some of the difficulties that have come about with General Vang Pao and Neo Hom 1834 
and some of the rhetoric that's accompanied that.  That's safer political ground, if you will.   1835 
 1836 
[McKeithen & Interviewer talk about issues related to the Hmong in Minnesota] 1837 
 1838 
(1:17:24)  So you said you came back here to visit Doc Weldon and that's when you sort of 1839 
decided this might be a place to … 1840 
I was—I was—he had—he was working for Bechtel in Korea and he had married—well, he had 1841 
worked in the refugee camps, actually.  He had—he was the medical doctor working for Catholic 1842 
Relief Services in charge of Nong Khai, in Nong Khai camp.  After he left Laos he went to the 1843 
Philippines and then he did emergency room work in New Orleans for three years, as he put it, to 1844 
get his hand back in clinical medicine.  And then he went to work in Saudi Arabia with Bechtel.  1845 
And at a certain point, and I've got these—I don't have the sequence right, but at a certain point he 1846 
ended up, while I was in the refugee section—'79 to '81—working for CRS in Nong Khai, living in 1847 
Nong Khai.  My wife introduced me to his wife, who just passed away.  And he then went to—and 1848 
Becky, his daughter moved to Thailand, did some work in the camps, did a lot with a lot of the 1849 
French speakers doing histories with the elite people in the camps.  Becky still lives here.  So he 1850 
then—I don't know how he ended up in Chiang Rai, but ask Becky—oh, Becky married the owner 1851 
who just died—former owner of the Golden Triangle Inn, whose brother now runs it.  And she 1852 
built, on her father's instructions, she built him a house—she's a good builder—on a piece of 1853 
property that he bought here south of town.  He was working in Korea and came back from time to 1854 
time.  And the house was finished.  We were still in Bangkok [Pauses] and when—and whenever—I 1855 
can't remember exactly when that house was finished, but I think it may have been mid-80s when 1856 
we came back to Thailand—yes, in '84, '85—and visited him, he was fully retired at that point.  And 1857 
liked Chiang Rai and then bought some land and built on it.  So that's how he ended up here.  But 1858 
he had done work in the Lao refugee camps in Nong Khai, specifically.  I think—I don't know if he 1859 
ever went to Ban Vinai or not.  I'm not sure.  But he was the—and then, CRS made him—put him 1860 
in charge of their country-wide medical program for all camps, which he hated because it was very 1861 
bureaucratic.  He preferred the clinical stuff.  So he worked with CRS for a couple years in Thailand. 1862 
 1863 
(1:20:53)  Vint Lawrence said that he visited Doc Weldon not that long before he died, if I 1864 
remember correctly. 1865 
Yeah, I wasn't here.  I was—I can't remember where I was, but probably in the States.  But I know 1866 
Vint came out and—yeah. 1867 
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 1868 
(1:21:10)  He said Doc Weldon literally refused—he just did not want to go back to Laos.  He 1869 
was kind of embittered about the experience he had there.  Do you recall him… 1870 
I don't know—I'm not sure.  I'll take Vint's word for it, but he—toward the last five, 10 years, just 1871 
didn't want to travel at all.  He never went back to the States.  Never went anywhere.  Made 1872 
furniture and hung out here.  Traveling was not his thing. 1873 
I'm sure he'd done enough in a way. 1874 
He had an endless stream of visitors coming to talk to him, which he enjoyed.  And he stayed active 1875 
and busy.  But he didn't treat himself.  He finally admitted that he ignored the advice that he 1876 
routinely gave his patients about routine checkups and this and that.  He had a stubborn streak, 1877 
particularly with regards to his own health.  And he just let it go much too long. 1878 
 1879 
(1:22:20)  So when you get together with people who shared some or most or all of these 1880 
experiences with you, when you kind of get beyond the funny stories about people who did 1881 
silly things or things of that nature and maybe you've had a few drinks or whatever, and you 1882 
start reflecting on the broader experience—if indeed that happens. 1883 
It happens, yeah. 1884 
What kinds of themes come out of … 1885 
What a waste, particularly in the context of the national interest, what a waste.  Because it really was.  1886 
It was—the whole—I don't know.  We just—we don't seem to learn. 1887 
Is there—I'm sorry.  Please go ahead. 1888 
Part of our job was—in those days the press was the enemy.  Reporters were—Sam Thong existed 1889 
to deflect attention from the existence of Long Tieng.  So anytime reporters came even to Sam 1890 
Thong, it was something to be viewed with great apprehension.  And we had a secretary named Ann 1891 
Bradley, who went on to become an administrative officer in AID.  A very good career.  She was 1892 
sitting by the desk in Sam Thong and Vientiane called on the radio and said that a planeload of 1893 
reporters was en route to Sam Thong.  And she said, ‘Hey, there's a planeload of reporters en route 1894 
to Sam Thong.  What do we do?’  And somebody said, ‘Fuck 'em.’  And she said, ‘But that's not in 1895 
my job description.’  [Interviewer guffaws]  Which was perfect.  Perfect response.  But there were 1896 
reporters and there were reporters.  Henry Kamm worked for the New York Times—K-a-m-m.  1897 
Really smart.  He was a reporter who knew the answer to the question before he ever asked it.  He 1898 
did his homework.  He was really savvy.  And he wrote a lot about the—you'll see his stuff in the 1899 
New York Times archives, his articles from Laos.  They are spot on.  Very sharp.  Good French 1900 
speaker.  Very sharp guy.  Robert Shaplen, not bad.  I mean, so—but Laos did tend to attract the 1901 
Tammy Arbuckles and the people that—the real amateurs.  They were just looking for sensation and 1902 
so forth.  And we were not in a very good position to give, really, an accurate picture of what was 1903 
going on because we were sort of at a very low level of things.  We knew nothing, virtually nothing 1904 
about the air war except the sequellae, which we saw enough of to realize that it was pretty bad.  I 1905 
mean … 1906 
Sequellae? 1907 
Well, the consequences—I mean, I saw the result of an air strike where the pilot misread the 1908 
coordinates.  He was in the wrong map quadrant -- instead of TG it was TF.  He was off by 100 1909 
kilometers.  Blew apart a village.  He was 100 kilometers off.  And the Air Force couldn't hit 1910 
anything because they were going so fast and it was all instrument work.  They all relied on this 1911 
TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation navagation aids. And when Phu Pha Thi, site 85 fell, two days 1912 
later Johnson announced an end to the bombing of North Vietnam.  The Vietnamese, for whatever 1913 
reason, whether it was coincidental or not, naturally assumed that it was because of a technical 1914 
reason. The radar operators at Pha Thi could tell the pilots where to go.  They could vector them 1915 
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through weather to bomb targets in North Vietnam.  And so under those circumstances would one 1916 
ever think that the Vietnamese would ever give up that site?  No.  Yet we supported VP's attempts 1917 
to try to retake Phou Pha Thi.  It was crazy. 1918 
 1919 
(1:27:32)  Have you kept track of VP's career and what he's been up to in the United States 1920 
or is that something you…? 1921 
No.  Only recently because my brother is a lawyer that knows this attorney that's taken on his case 1922 
pro bono, John Keker.  And so he sent me the briefs.  And Paul White told me, disclosed about a 1923 
year or two ago what he said in his speech at a, I think, a Hmong Air—I don't know if I'm getting 1924 
this right, but a Hmong Air Force reunion. 1925 
That had to be a very small gathering. 1926 
Anyway, it was a gathering of Hmong.  It was in—somewhere around Minnesota or Michigan.  Paul 1927 
was there.  There were a lot of photographs of him and VP.  And he gave a little—VP asked him to 1928 
say a few words and he disclosed that he had turned down an ambassadorial appointment to Laos.  1929 
That Madeleine Albright—he was USAID director in Mexico.  Madeleine Albright had asked him to 1930 
be ambassador to Laos and he said, ‘I can't do it because I can't work with the PL.’  And he never 1931 
told anybody about it.  And this was amazing.  Here's a guy, not independently wealthy.  USAID 1932 
career officer.  The chance to be an ambassador.  That's a big deal.  And he turned it down on 1933 
principle.  It's huge.  That is really, really, I mean… 1934 
They didn't say— 1935 
Well, I think he made a horrible mistake.  I think he would have done a fantastic job.  But in his 1936 
soul—we roomed at Sam Thong for a couple years.  Yeah.  In his soul, he said, ‘I can't work with 1937 
these people.  They've done too many bad things to my friends.’  That is really—you don't find 1938 
many people make a decision like that.  And Wendy Chamberlain got the gig instead.  That was the 1939 
timing. 1940 
 1941 
(1:29:55)  Interesting.  I sat down with Paul and Tom Ward and Carol Mills all at the same 1942 
time. 1943 
Oh, wow. 1944 
And then Paul got up and left kind of in the middle, so I'm sure there are other tales he 1945 
could have told, but Tom says he has a way of getting up and leaving in the middle of 1946 
things. 1947 
Did you—Paul also has a great set of photographs.   1948 
Yes.  In fact, I think I've downloaded all of them or at least most of them.  He donated them 1949 
to the Hmong Cultural Center in St. Paul and I made a tiny little documentary about the 1950 
Hmong resettlement to the Twin Cities. 1951 
 1952 
[Small redaction to conversation here.] 1953 
 1954 
Well, I'm looking at the watch also. 1955 
Oh, OK.  So it's about that time. 1956 
Yeah. 1957 
Well, I think we've covered pretty much everything. 1958 
Yeah.  I wish I had a better memory.  That would be nice if I could remember this stuff. 1959 
 1960 
[Small redaction] 1961 
 1962 
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I can't thank you enough.  This has been great.  I really appreciate it a lot.  And let me turn 1963 
all this junk off first. 1964 
